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TAMING AMERICA’S SUGAR RUSH: A 
TRAFFIC-LIGHT LABEL APPROACH 
Alexia Brunet Marks* 
Excess added sugar negatively impacts health and can lead to a litany of problems, 
such as diet-related chronic diseases, e.g., diabetes, cancer, heart disease, and 
obesity, costing Americans millions in rising medical bills each year. Even more, 
new studies reveal that individuals with these underlying chronic diseases are at a 
higher risk of complications from COVID-19 and other viruses compared to those 
who are deemed healthy. And yet added sugars are difficult to avoid because unlike 
naturally occurring sugars found in fruits, vegetables, and milk, these sweeteners 
are added during food processing and preparation. 
The problem is that while consumers base their first impressions on the nutritional 
quality of a product by looking at the front of the package, there is no federal 
regulation or standard for food manufacturers to quickly communicate added sugar 
risks to consumers on the front of the package. The new Food and Drug 
Administration’s Nutritional Fact Panel regulations require food manufacturers to 
disclose sugar content only on the back of the food package, leaving the front of the 
package for catchy brand advertising. The food industry takes advantage of this 
regulatory gap, using unregulated phrases like “just a tad sweet,” “sorta sweet,” 
“lightly sweetened,” and “slightly sweet,” to peddle their foods as low in sugar 
when they are actually high in added sugar. Angered by this, consumers are filing 
lawsuits against food and beverage companies for misleading claims and false 
advertising. Federal regulators could act upon misleading claims, but instead they 
remain silent as the food industry profits from the added sugars in nearly 80% of 
the approximately 600,000 foods in the marketplace. 
This Article presents a timely, new labeling solution to address this problem: a 
mandatory, colorful traffic-light indicator on the front of the package, warning 
consumers of high nutritional content—i.e., an indicator of high fat, salt, sugar, or 
added sugar content—similar to one used in the United Kingdom. The new label 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. J.D., 
Northwestern University; Ph.D., Purdue University (Agricultural Economics). For thoughtful 
comments on earlier drafts, I thank Timothy Lytton, Michael Roberts, Susan Schneider and 
Steph Tai, Michael Marks and our three Cs, as well as workshop participants at the American 
Society of International Law Biennial Research Forum, the Academy of Food Law and Policy 
Annual Meeting, and the University of Copenhagen iCourts Center. I welcome all comments 
at alexia.brunet@colorado.edu. 
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also responds to two additional and pressing trends: (1) the rise in demand for 
regulating the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages in the United States, 
evidenced by a growing number of local taxes and warning labels; and (2) the rise 
in demand for regulating the consumption of unhealthy foods generally, evidenced 
by warning labels and plain-packaging approaches in Chile and other countries. 
This Article uniquely examines mandatory front-of-package labeling in the context 
of tobacco regulation to gauge food industry response to a traffic-light labeling 
approach. Using comparative law, this Article presents an accurate and thorough 
discussion of the legal challenges a new label will encounter in domestic court, 
arbitral tribunals, e.g., the Bilateral Investment Treaty, Philip Morris v. Australia 
claim, and multilateral courts, e.g., the World Trade Organization, Australia 
Tobacco Plain Packaging claim. 
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INTRODUCTION: SURROUNDED BY HIDDEN SUGARS 
In January 2020, several plaintiffs filed a legal complaint against The Coca-
Cola Company alleging that they were misled into believing that Honest Tea 
beverages labeled as “Just a Tad Sweet” were low in sugar and calories.1 Of note, 
the product’s Nutrition Facts Panel (“NFP”), located on the back or the side of the 
food package, describes the bottle as containing 15 grams of added sugar, 
representing 30% of one’s daily value of added sugar. The plaintiffs’ claims—
consumer protection, misrepresentation, breach of express and implied warranty, 
fraud, and unjust enrichment—are based on the view that “Just a Tad Sweet” 
misrepresents the amount of sugar in the food, causing confusion and risk to those 
 
 1. Complaint at 2–3, Batchelor v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 7:20-cv-00594 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.classaction.org/media/batchelor-v-the-coca-cola-company.pdf.  
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trying to reduce their sugar intake. The problem is that food manufacturers are only 
required to list added sugar on the NFP, rather than on the most influential part of 
the package—the front-of-package (“FOP”) label. Federal rules only require that 
manufacturers place two things on the FOP label: the name of the food and the net 
quantity. The rest is purely advertising. This lawsuit, and others like it, highlight 
how the food industry takes advantage of regulatory gaps to mislead consumers 
about added sugars in their foods. 
Over the past decades, global diets have shifted away from traditional foods 
toward high-sugar foods. In the United States, the average American consumes more 
packaged foods and more sugary beverages than 50 years ago. And these unhealthy 
foods have become more abundant, proliferating in supermarket shelves, vending 
machines, schools, and convenience stores.2 Sugar consumption worldwide has 
tripled over the past 50 years,3 confirmed by data from the 2016 National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey, showing that Americans are eating and drinking too 
much sugar4 (on average 152 pounds annually in 2001).5 But total sugars are not the 
only concern. In 2014, the National Institutes of Health cautioned that excess sugar 
consumption in America contributes to the obesity epidemic, noting that much “of 
the sugar we eat isn’t found naturally in food but is added during processing or 
preparation.”6 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), which regulates 80% of 
the food and beverage products consumed in this country, distinguishes between: 
(1) naturally occurring sugars found in many nutritious foods and beverages; and 
(2) added sugars or sugar added to foods and beverages for taste, texture, and 
preservation.7 Examples of naturally occurring sugars are found in foodssuch as fruit 
 
 2. See Shifting the Balance: Getting the Private Sector to Favour Nutritious, 
Affordable and Accessible Diets, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.fao.org
/news/story/en/item/1118441/icode/. 
 3. See JOHN S. YUDKIN, PURE, WHITE AND DEADLY 8–14 (2d ed. 1986) (noting 
the evolution of the human diet focusing on our shift from proteins and fats toward 
carbohydrates, starches, and sugars); see also MARION NESTLE, WHAT TO EAT 320–21 (2006) 
(noting the huge increase in sugar consumption between 1980 and 2004 during which time 
the consumption of high-fructose corn syrup doubled); Stephanie Strom, U.S. Cuts Estimate 
of Sugar Intake, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27
/business/us-cuts-estimate-of-sugar-intake-of-typical-american.html (noting a USDA study 
reporting per capita sugar consumption at 76.7 pounds/year). See generally JEFF O’CONNELL, 
SUGAR NATION: THE HIDDEN TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA’S DEADLIEST HABIT AND THE SIMPLE 
WAY TO BEAT IT (2010) (noting that human diets have focused more on palatability than 
nutrition). 
 4. See SHANTHY A. BOWMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIETARY DATA BRIEF 
NO. 24, ADDED SUGARS IN ADULTS’ DIET: WHAT WE EAT IN AMERICA, NHANES 2015–2016 
(2019), https://www.ars.usda.gov/ARSUserFiles/80400530/pdf/DBrief/24_Sources_of
_Added_Sugars_in_Adults'_Diet_2015-2016.pdf.  
 5. See OFF. OF COMMS., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE FACT BOOK 2001-
2002, at 20 (2001). 
 6. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Sweet Stuff: How Sugars and Sweeteners Affect Your 
Health, NIH NEWS IN HEALTH 1 (Oct. 2014) (emphasis added), 
https://newsinhealth.nih.gov/sites/nihNIH/files/2014/October/NIHNiHOct2014.pdf. 
 7. See Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutritional and Supplement Facts Labels, 
81 Fed. Reg. 33,742, 33,799 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
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and milk (fructose and lactose).8 The category of added sugars comprises hundreds 
of ingredient names—from familiar table sugar to unfamiliar treacle and sucrovert—
that are added to foods or beverages during processing or preparation.9 These 
hundreds of added sugars fall into two groups. Nutritive sweeteners add calories to 
one’s diet; some examples include natural sugars, such as table sugar, brown sugar, 
honey, and fruit juice, as well as chemically manufactured sugars, such as high-
fructose corn syrup.10 Non-nutritive sweeteners do not have calories and include 
“high-intensity sweeteners” (also known as “artificial sweeteners”), which are 
sweeteners many times sweeter than table sugar. Examples include saccharin, 
aspartame, sucralose, and less known, acesulfame potassium, neotame, and 
advantame.11 Added sugars can also include enzymes containing compounds that 
functionally substitute for added sugar.12  
Importantly, in contrast to their naturally occurring counterparts, added 
sugars do not contain fiber to counteract the fructose in the food (leading to weight 
gain when consuming added sugars).13 Given their many names, added sugars 
remain hidden in the ingredient list of most packaged and prepared foods, ranging 
from sodas,  energy drinks, and sports drinks to bread, salad dressing, and tomato 
sauce.14 In fact, an estimated 80% of the approximately 600,000 processed food 
products on the market contain not only naturally occurring sugar but also various 
forms of added sugars.15 
 
 8. Interactive Nutrition Facts Label, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/interactivenutritionfactslabel/ (last visited Sept. 15, 
2020).  
 9. Margot Sanger-Katz, You’d Be Surprised at How Many Foods Contain Added 
Sugar, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/upshot/it-isnt-
easy-to-figure-out-which-foods-contain-sugar.html. 
 10. Additional Information About High-Intensity Sweeteners Permitted for Use in 
Food in the United States, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/food-
additives-petitions/additional-information-about-high-intensity-sweeteners-permitted-use-
food-united-states; see also European Food Safety Auth., Protocol for the Scientific Opinion 
on the Tolerable Upper Intake Level of Dietary Sugars, EFSA J. 6 (July 12, 2018), 
https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5393 (giving a definition 
that was first applied in the United States Dietary Guidelines for Americans (USDA/HHS 
2000), and then adopted by the Institute of Medicine (2005), the European Food Safety 
Authority, and European countries (Nordic Council of Ministers)). 
 11. High-Intensity Sweeteners, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-additives-petitions/high-intensity-sweeteners (last updated 
May 19, 2014).  
 12. 21 C.F.R. § 101.60(c)(2)(iii) (2020). 
 13. See YUDKIN, supra note 3, at 13.  
 14. See WILLIAM DUFTY, SUGAR BLUES 151 (1975); YUDKIN, supra note 3, at 13 
(explaining that some foods, such as fruits, have natural vitamins and do not present the same 
health concerns). See generally Robert H. Lustig et al., The Toxic Truth About Sugar, 482 
NATURE 27 (2012), https://www.nature.com/articles/482027a.pdf. 
 15. Monica Eng, Anti-Sugar Doctor Robert Lustig Talks More About What’s 
Wrong with the American Diet, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 17, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com
/dining/ct-xpm-2013-01-17-chi-food-policy-robert-lustig-dishes-on-low-carb-obama-toxic-
sugar-juice-and-more-20130117-story.html. 
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Increased sugar consumption, coupled with a decrease in overall caloric 
needs, has increased the percentage of calories coming from sugars and has made it 
much more difficult to meet nutrient needs. “The brain is dependent on sugar as its 
main fuel,” and glucose levels are closely linked to brain functions, such as thinking, 
memory, and learning.16 While the brain needs glucose,17 a growing number of 
independent studies show that excess sugar consumption can damage brain health, 
impair psychological well-being, and lead to chronic, noncommunicable health 
diseases like heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and obesity.18 Obesity, defined as 
abnormal or excessive fat accumulation, affects roughly 42% of adults in the United 
States19 and is a major risk factor for diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and cancer.20 
Childhood obesity rates, meanwhile, have doubled (in some cases, tripled) in 
developed countries over the past 30 years.21 Research confirms that sugar is 
 
 16. Scott Edwards, Sugar and the Brain, HARV. MED. SCH., 
https://neuro.hms.harvard.edu/harvard-mahoney-neuroscience-institute/brain-newsletter
/and-brain-series/sugar-and-brain (last visited July 15, 2020). 
 17. Id. (noting a 2012 UCLA study linking fructose consumption with cell aging, 
and a 2009 University of Montreal and Boston College study linking excess glucose 
consumption to memory and cognitive deficiencies). 
 18. See generally Quanhe Yang et al., Added Sugar Intake and Cardiovascular 
Diseases Mortality Among U.S. Adults, 174 JAMA: INTERNAL MED. 516, 516 (2014).  
 19. See Obesity and Overweight, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int
/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/obesity-and-overweight (last visited Aug. 28, 2020); see also 
CRAIG M. HALES ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 
360, PREVALENCE OF OBESITY AND SEVERE OBESITY AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2017–
2018 (2020). 
 20. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., DATA 
BRIEF NO. 82, PREVALENCE OF OBESITY IN THE U.S., 2009–2010, at 1–3 (2012), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db82.pdf (noting that obesity increases the risk of a 
number of health conditions including hypertension, adverse lipid concentrations, and type 2 
diabetes); Obesity and Overweight, supra note 19; Obesity, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/topics/obesity/en/ (last visited July 24, 2020) (explaining that a crude 
measure of obesity is the body mass index (“BMI”), a person’s weight (in kilograms) divided 
by the square of his/her height (in meters), and that a BMI of 30 or more is considered obese 
while a BMI equal to or more than 25 is considered overweight); see also U.S. & World 
Population Clocks, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2020); ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://data.census.gov/cedsci (last visited July 24, 2020) (nearly 80 million minors, 234 
million adults). 
 21. See generally Mercedes de Onis et al., Global Prevalence and Trends of 
Overweight and Obesity Among Preschool Children, 92 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1257 
(2010). 
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addictive, like nicotine or cocaine, by making users dependent,22 and processed 
foods with added sweeteners and fats demonstrate the greatest addictive potential.23 
With added sugars gaining attention as a public health risk, federal 
regulators responded in 2016 by passing new regulations to require food 
manufacturers to disclose added sugar content, but only on the NFP (typically found 
on the side or the back of a food package). The FDA, through the Food Drug and 
Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”),24 regulates nutritional labeling on food products. The 
final rule revising the NFP, which goes into effect in January 2020,25 mandates a 
line for added sugars (under carbohydrates) and a recommended percentage Daily 
Value (“%DV”) derived from the U.S. Dietary Guidelines for Americans for added 
sugar intake.26 Before this label change, different types of sugars were lumped into 
a “total sugars” line on the NFP. For example, many fruit yogurts contain sugars 
from three sources: (1) lactose from milk; (2) natural sugars from fruit; and (3) added 
sugars. Before the new labeling rule, these were reported as one figure under total 
sugars; the new labels distinguish added sugars to help people understand exactly 
how much they are consuming based on how much they should be eating.27 This 
 
 22. See Nicole M. Avena et al., Evidence for Sugar Addiction: Behavioral and 
Neurochemical Effects of Intermittent, Excessive Sugar Intake, 32 NEUROSCIENCE & 
BIOBEHAVIOR REV. 20, 32 (2008) (summarizing strong evidence of sugar dependence in an 
animal model); see also Carlo Colantuoni et al., Evidence that Intermittent, Excessive Sugar 
Intake Causes Endogenous Opioid Dependence, 10 OBESITY RES. 478, 486 (2002) (noting 
“[r]epeated, excessive intake of sugar created a state in which an opioid antagonist caused 
behavioral and neurochemical signs of opioid withdrawal . . . suggesting that the rats had 
become sugar-dependent”); Eliza L. Gordon et al., What is the Evidence for “Food 
Addiction?” A Systematic Review, 10 NUTRIENTS 477, 477 (2018) (providing evidence that 
suggests processed foods with added sweeteners and fats have the greatest addictive 
potential); BA Gosnell & AS Levine, Reward Systems and Food Intake: Role of Opioids, 33 
INT’L J. OBESITY S54, S54 (2009); Victor Mangabeira et al., Sugar Withdrawal and 
Differential Reinforcement of Low Rate (DRL) Performance in Rats, 139 PHYSIOLOGY & 
BEHAV. 468, 468 (2015) (“[C]onfirming the parallel effects of addictive drugs and sugar and 
suggesting an increase in impulsivity as a consequence of sugar deprivation.”). 
 23. See Gordon et al., supra note 22, at 490–91 (noting the addictiveness of 
processed foods with added sweeteners and fats: eating sugar signals the brain and activates 
reward pathways, causing a surge of dopamine and serotonin, also causing the prefrontal 
cortex to release hormones that trigger remembering the experience, and explaining that 
during the sugar crash, there is a dopamine and serotonin deficit, causing moodiness and 
depression similar to reactions induced by addictive opioids and nicotine). 
 24. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i (2018). 
 25. See Industry Resources on the Changes to the Nutrition Facts Panel, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/industry-
resources-changes-nutrition-facts-label (last updated Mar. 26, 2020) (providing compliance 
dates). 
 26. See Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplemental Facts Labels, 
81 Fed. Reg. 33,742, 33,748 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 27. See id. at 33,744; see also Side-by-Side Comparison, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/97999/download (last visited July 19, 2020) (showing 
new label compared to old label). 
2020] TAMING AMERICA'S SUGAR RUSH 689 
new label change has the potential to improve dietary intake and reduce diet-related 
chronic disease.28 
With numerous studies pronouncing added sugar a public health risk, the 
new NFP regulation fails to communicate this risk to consumers in a quick and easy 
format. While national and global nutritional indicators were used to develop the 
guidelines for added sugar disclosure, in the end, the thresholds (high versus low) 
and presentation requirement (information panel versus front of package) are among 
the most conservative in the world. The NFP recommends that no more than 10% 
of daily calories come from added sugar based on a 2,000-calorie diet (this equals 
50 grams or 200 calories per day).29 A few other countries aimed for lower daily 
amount values of 4.5% to 6.5% of total daily calories (25 grams or 100 calories per 
day for women and 150 for men).30 Despite the voluminous literature showing that 
consumers base their first impressions on the nutritional quality of a product by 
looking at the front of the package, the FDA required presentation on the 
informational panel and not the front of the package.31 As will be discussed, some 
countries use these thresholds for their FOP labeling in addition to NFP labeling.32 
In Europe, the principal food regulatory agency, the European Food Safety 
Authority (“EFSA”), allows each European member country to establish its own 
dietary guideline for added sugar,33 but highlights that the European food industry 
 
 28. See INST. OF MED., EXAMINATION OF FRONT-OF-PACK NUTRITION RATING 
SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS: PHASE 1 REPORT (2010), https://doi.org/10.17226/12957; see also 
STANDING COMM. ON HEALTH, CAN. HOUSE OF COMMONS, HEALTHY WEIGHTS AND HEALTHY 
KIDS 14 (2007), https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/391/HESA/Reports
/RP2795145/hesarp07/hesarp07-e.pdf; LYNN STOCKLEY, EUROPEAN HEART NETWORK, 
REVIEW OF ‘FRONT-OF-PACK’ NUTRITION SCHEMES (2007), https://www.5aldia.org/datos
/60/PDF_8_5370.pdf. 
 29. See SHANTHY A. BOWMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIETARY DATA BRIEF 
NO. 18, ADDED SUGARS INTAKE OF AMERICANS: WHAT WE EAT IN AMERICA, NHANES 2013–
–2014 (2017),  https://www.ars.usda.gov/ARSUserFiles/80400530/pdf/DBrief/18_Added_
Sugars_Intake_of_Americans_2013-2014.pdf; see also Anne Kavanagh, Sugar’s Sick 
Secrets: How Industry Forces Have Manipulated Science to Downplay the Harm, UCSF 
MAGAZINE (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2018/12/412916/sugars-sick-secrets-
how-industry-forces-have-manipulated-science-downplay-harm (noting that Americans eat 
substantially more sugar than recommended at about 17 teaspoons a day instead of the 
recommended 12 teaspoons maximum). 
 30. See Rachel K. Johnson et al., Dietary Sugars Intake and Cardiovascular 
Health: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association, 120 CIRCULATION 1011, 
1016–17 (2009). 
 31. See, e.g., Melissa G. Bublitz et al., Why Did I Eat That? Perspectives on Food 
Decision Making and Dietary Restraint, 20 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 239, 251 (2010); Judith 
A. Garretson & Scot Burton, Effects of Nutrition Facts Panel Values, Nutrition Claims, and 
Health Claims on Consumer Attitudes, Perceptions of Disease-Related Risks, and Trust, 19 
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 213, 224 (2000); John C. Kozup et al., Making Healthful Food 
Choices: The Influence of Health Claims and Nutrition Information on Consumers’ 
Evaluations of Packaged Food Products and Restaurant Menu Items, 67 J. MARKETING 19, 
20–26 (2003). 
 32. See infra Section III.B. 
 33. See European Food Safety Auth., Scientific Opinion on Establishing Food-
Based Dietary Guidelines, EFSA J. 2 (Mar. 25, 2010), https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com
/doi/abs/10.2903/j.efsa.2010.1460. 
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uses 90 grams as its daily consumption guideline for labeling total sugar content.34 
In 2016, five Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland) 
asked EFSA to develop a European-wide upper-limit of added sugar intake, and 
EFSA is due to develop one in late 2020.35 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom opted 
for the 10% added sugar recommendation as a daily reference value on the 
nutritional panel (equal to that of the United States). But in addition to 
communicating this risk on the nutrition panel, it also communicates the added sugar 
risk on the FOP label using a traffic-light labeling system.36 
Food labeling has the potential to provide consumers with clear, actionable 
information to help them make healthy choices and limit their added sugar 
consumption. As the lawsuits highlight, one problem is that the added sugar risk is 
not communicated on the front of the package, which is the place where consumers 
are most likely to look first. The new regulations ask manufacturers to disclose sugar 
content on the back of the food package but allow the food industry to advertise on 
the front of the package. The food industry takes advantage of this regulatory gap 
by using catchy, unregulated, and impliedly “low sugar” claims, like “just a tad 
sweet,” “sorta sweet,” “lightly sweetened,” and “slightly sweet,” to present their 
foods as low in sugar when they are actually high in added sugar. 
Consumers do their best to communicate dissatisfaction with claims they 
feel mislead them to buy sugary foods at a time when they are trying to select foods 
with less sugar.37 In California and New York, consumers have filed suits against 
various food and beverage companies, bringing federal and state law claims 
regarding added sugars.38 All the while, litigation challenging industry use of other 
unregulated, implied low-sugar terms, such as “healthy” and “natural,” continues.39 
 
 34. See European Food Safety Auth., Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Dietetic 
Products, Nutrition and Allergies on a Request from the Commission Related to the Review 
of Labelling Reference Intake Values for Selected Nutritional Elements, EFSA J. 3 (May 4, 
2009), http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/1008.pdf. 
 35. Sugars Opinion Rescheduled to Assess Wealth of Data, EUROPEAN FOOD 
SAFETY AUTH. (July 19, 2019), https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/190719; see 
European Food Safety Auth., Scientific Opinion on Dietary Reference Values for 
Carbohydrates and Dietary Fibre, EFSA J.  1–2 (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.efsa.europa.eu
/en/efsajournal/pub/1462.htm. 
 36. See generally Sugar: Food Facts Sheet, BRITISH DIETETIC ASSOC., 
https://www.bda.uk.com/resource/sugar.html (last visited July 19, 2020). 
 37. During an International Sweetener Colloquium in February 2020, the message 
was that sugar avoidance was a macro trend “that is here to stay and will only increase.” See 
Ron Sterk, Avoidance of Sugar Remains Macro Trend, FOOD BUS. NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/11380-avoidance-of-sugar-remains-macro-trend. 
 38. Casey v. Odwalla, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 284, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Ries v. 
Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 527 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see Complaint, supra note 
1, at 2–3.  
 39. The FDA does not provide a definition for “natural” but states that it means 
“that nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of source) has 
been included in, or has been added to, a food that would not normally be expected to be in 
that food.” Use of the Term Natural on Food Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/use-term-natural-food-labeling (last 
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Dissatisfied consumers also press for legislation to tax sugar-sweetened beverages 
and to place sugar warnings on billboards. The food industry challenges class-action 
lawsuits, spends enormous amounts of money repealing local tax legislation, and 
even litigates against other food companies to preserve their market share40 as 
federal regulators delay regulation of FOP claims. 
Consumer litigation and other initiatives are symptomatic of a larger 
problem: there is no standardized way to communicate added sugar risks to 
consumers on the front of the food package. Federal regulators allow the food 
industry to self-regulate the nutrition claims they use on the front of the package. 
These claims mislead consumers and impact vulnerable populations, such as 
children—the target of much “unhealthy” food advertising despite industry-
sponsored reports that claim a high level of observance to voluntary codes.41 Given 
the regulatory gaps, the dietary risks associated with added sugars, and the inability 
of the industry to police itself, regulation is needed to provide more transparency in 
food labeling. 
This Article develops a new FOP labeling solution—a colorful traffic-light 
indicator for nutritional information—to replace currently used industry nutritional 
labeling and to provide more effective risk communication for consumers. This 
symbol would be mandatory for all food manufacturers and would display negative 
nutritional content, i.e., red indicator used for high fat, salt, or sugar and added sugar 
content. The new indicator also responds to two pressing trends: (1) the rise in 
demand for regulating the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages in the United 
States, evidenced by a growing number of local taxes and warning labels; and (2) 
the rise in demand for regulating the consumption of unhealthy foods generally, 
evidenced by warning labels and plain-packaging approaches in Chile and other 
countries.42 
This Article makes several contributions. This is the first Article to call for 
a new, mandatory FOP approach to inform consumers of added sugar content, to 
make more healthful decisions, and to nudge the food industry to reformulate 
 
updated Oct. 22, 2018). The U.S. Department of Agriculture regulates this term for use on 
meat and dairy products as: “[a] product containing no artificial ingredient or added color and 
is only minimally processed . . . in a manner that does not fundamentally alter the product.” 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MEAT AND POULTRY LABELING TERMS 3 (2011), 
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/e2853601-3edb-45d3-90dc-
1bef17b7f277/Meat_and_Poultry_Labeling_Terms.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. Labeling must 
include a statement explaining the term natural “such as ‘no artificial ingredients; minimally 
processed.’” Id. 
 40. For example, POM Wonderful sued competitor Minute Maid, for selling a 
pomegranate juice that had more added sugars than claimed—i.e., POM argued that the 
competitor’s juice product was not purely pomegranate juice and could not advertise it as 
such. POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., No. 07-02633, 2008 WL 4222045, at *4–5, 
*9 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2008). Juice samples submitted to independent laboratories detected 
added sugar, showing that the competitor’s 100% juice claim on its label was false. Id. 
 41. See generally S. Galbraith-Emami & T. Lobstein, The Impact of Initiatives to 
Limit the Advertising of Food and Beverage Products to Children: A Systematic Review, 14 
OBESITY REVIEWS 960 (2013). 
 42. See infra Section III.B. 
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foods.43 This Article examines mandatory FOP labeling in another context (tobacco 
regulation) to gauge food industry response to a traffic-light labeling approach. And 
using comparative law, this Article presents an accurate and thorough discussion of 
foreseeable legal challenges that this solution may encounter from big food 
companies in domestic courts, arbitral proceedings (using Bilateral Investment 
Treaty claims as seen in the Philip Morris v. Australia arbitral proceedings), and in 
a multilateral setting (using World Trade Organization claims as seen in Australia—
Tobacco Plain Packaging complaints). Importantly, this Article supports previous 
studies (such as those by National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and 
Medicine, and others) that added sugar content should be placed on the front of the 
food packages44 and extends a list of legal studies in public health advocating for 
added-sugar labeling and a traffic-light, front-of-package system. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the legal framework of 
federal labeling rules aimed at curbing sugar consumption. Part II addresses the 
demand for more added-sugar regulation through taxes, graphic warnings, and 
symbols. Part III presents a new, traffic-light labeling solution to correct failed 
industry attempts to self-regulate through voluntary codes. Part IV presents potential 
legal challenges in domestic and international courts, and Part V concludes. 
I. MANDATORY LABELING FOR SUGAR 
Sugar is a sweetener; a crop; a functional ingredient; and an ingredient for 
baking, texturizing, and preserving. Sugar is also the subject of litigation and 
international disputes. Given that added sugars contribute to the rise of diet-related 
chronic disease, countries are trying to limit sugar intake. One argument for 
additional regulation relates to market failure: diet-related chronic disease is a food 
industry externality. The food industry does not internalize the cost related to the 
added sugars that they use. Local efforts to curb sugar consumption only go so far; 
a uniform federal approach is needed to regulate sugar through labelling. This 
section discusses the baseline of what manufacturers are required to state on food 
labels generally and what they are required to state regarding sugar. 
A. Basic Requirements for Food Labeling 
The FDA regulates most packaged foods sold in the United States and has 
specific requirements for what elements a package must contain and where those 
elements must be placed. The two display surfaces on packaged goods are the 
principal display panel (typically, the FOP label) and the informational panel on the 
right side of the FOP.45 The following items must be displayed on the packaging: 
the name of the food, often called the “standard of identity;” the net quantity of 
 
 43. See generally Deborah A. Cohen, Fighting Obesity: Why Chile Should 
Continue Placing ‘Stop Signs’ on Unhealthy Foods, RAND BLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/03/fighting-obesity-why-chile-should-continue-placing-
stop.html. 
 44. See Shelley McGuire, Front-of-Package Nutrition Rating Systems and 
Symbols: Promoting Healthier Choices, 3 ADVANCED NUTRITION 332, 332 (2012) (explaining 
that the Institute of Medicine Phase II report recommends that “‘added sugars’ should be 
added to the roster of nutritional components included in any front-of-package nutrition rating 
systems”). 
 45. 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1(a), 101.2(a) (2020). 
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contents; the nutrition facts; the ingredient and allergen statement; and the name and 
address of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor.46 Manufacturers can place all 
required components on the FOP label, or they can use the informational panel. 
However, two elements must go on the FOP label: the name of the product and the 
net quantity.47 Any nutrient-content claims must conform to certain rules, e.g., the 
claims can be displayed on the FOP, informational panel, or anywhere else on the 
package, in a type size not exceeding two times the size of the font used for the name 
of the product.48 Apart from these details, the basic requirements for food labeling 
are few, leaving most of the label for advertising. Because most of the label is 
advertising, what (if anything) constrains manufacturers from making misleading, 
false, and deceptive claims? 
Statutes exist to prevent food manufacturers from making misleading, 
false, and deceptive claims. The FDA, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), and 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) share jurisdiction over and enforce 
nutrient-content and health claims in food advertising made by food-products 
manufacturers.49 Congress established this regulatory scheme through 
complementary statutes. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTCA”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,”50 and in the case of food 
products, §§ 12 and 15 of the FTCA prohibit “any false advertisement” that is 
“misleading in a material respect.”51  The FDA’s authority is embodied in part in 
§ 403(a) of the FDCA which prohibits “labeling [that] is false or misleading in any 
particular” manner.52 Since 1954, the FTC and the FDA have operated under a 
memorandum of understanding; it provides for the FTC to assume primary 
responsibility for regulating food-advertising claims of FDA-regulated products, 
while the FDA takes primary responsibility for regulating food labeling.53 The FTC 
often relies on an advertiser’s compliance with FDA labeling regulations when it 
determines whether advertising claims are false or deceptive.54 The Nutrition 
 
 46. Id. § 101.2(b). 
 47. Id. §§ 101.3(a), 101.7(a). 
 48. Id. § 101.13. 
 49. Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(May 13, 1994), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1994/05/enforcement-policy-
statement-food-advertising. 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018). 
 51. Id. §§ 52(a), 55(a)(1). 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) (2018). USDA’s authority is derived from the Federal 
Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 601(n)(1) (2018) (prohibiting labeling of meat or meat 
products that is “false or misleading in any particular”), and the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 453(h)(1) (2018) (prohibiting labeling of poultry products that is “false or 
misleading in any particular”). 
 53. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOU 225-71-8003, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (1971), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/domestic-mous/mou-225-71-8003 
[hereinafter MOU]. 
 54. See Formula for Disaster: FTC Sues Gerber for Falsely Advertising Baby 
Formula as “FDA Approved,” CONSUMER PRODUCTS L. BLOG (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.consumerproductslawblog.com/2014/11/formula-for-disaster-ftc-sues-gerber-
for-falsely-advertising-baby-formula-as-fda-approved/. 
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Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (“NLEA”)55 amended § 403 of the FDCA and 
effected broad changes in the regulation of FDA-approved nutrition claims on food 
labels. Besides requiring nutrition information on virtually all food products, the 
NLEA directed the FDA to standardize and limit the terms permitted on labels, and 
allowed only FDA-approved nutrient-content claims and health claims to appear on 
food labels.56 While the NLEA is designed in part to prevent deceptive and 
misleading claims on labels, Congress also intended that nutrient-content and health 
claims educate consumers to assist them in maintaining healthy dietary practices.57 
The NLEA also mandated that the FDA undertake an effort to educate consumers 
about the new food label and the importance of diet to health.58 As noted earlier, the 
FDA regulates food labeling, while the FTC regulates food advertising. The FTC 
has said that it is unlikely the Commission will take action under §§ 5 and 12 of the 
FTCA regarding nutrient-content and health claims if they comply with the FDA’s 
regulations.59 
The FDCA regulates the labeling of sugar and added sugar as food 
ingredients (“articles used for food or drink”60) and food additives.61Approval of 
food additives requires scientists to determine that the additive meets the safety 
standard of reasonable certainty of no harm under the intended conditions of its 
use.62 Some additives do not require FDA approval before they can be used in food. 
The FDCA states that “substances that are generally recognized, among experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate their safety as having been 
adequately shown . . . to be safe under the conditions of their intended use” are 
 
 55. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 
2353 (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. § 343(i), (q) and (r)). 
 56. Id. The NLEA defines a “nutrient content claim” as any claim that expressly 
or by implication “characterizes the level of any nutrient.” 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(A) (Supp. 
1990). A “health claim” is defined as any claim that characterizes the relationship of any 
nutrient to a “disease or health related condition.” Id. § 343(r)(1)(B). See generally U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: A FOOD LABELING GUIDE (2013), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/81606/download (guide for NLEA application to FDA regulated 
foods). 
 57. “Health claims supported by a significant scientific agreement can reinforce 
the Surgeon General recommendations and help Americans to maintain a balanced and 
healthful diet. Similarly, statements regarding the level of these nutrients in foods will assist 
Americans in following the Surgeon General’s guidelines.” HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND 
COMMERCE, NUTRITION LABELING AND EDUCATION ACT OF 1990, H.R. Doc. No. 101-538, at 
9–10 (2d Sess. 1990).  
 58. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2(c), 
104 Stat. 2353 (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. § 343(i), (q) and (r)). 
 59. See MOU, supra note 53. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2018) (defining “food” as: “(1) Articles used for food or 
drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum and (3) articles used for components of any 
other such article”). 
 61. Id. § 321(s) (defining “food additive” as “any substance the intended use of 
which results or may reasonably be expected to result—directly or indirectly—in its 
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food”). 
 62. See Paulette Gaynor, How U.S. FDA’s GRAS Notification Program Works, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., at n.1 (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/generally-
recognized-safe-gras/how-us-fdas-gras-notification-program-works. 
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excluded from the food additive definition and are termed “generally recognized as 
safe” (“GRAS”).63 Put simply, substances that are GRAS under conditions of their 
intended use are not food additives and do not require premarket approval by the 
FDA. For additives that have not been determined as GRAS, a company can either 
notify the FDA and ask for approval, or it can make an independent GRAS 
determination with or without notifying the FDA.64  
Many of the common added sugars, like table sugar (sucrose) and high-
fructose corn syrup (made from glucose and fructose), have GRAS status (for 
now).65 Even other non-nutritive sweeteners, like sucralose (found in Stevia-brand 
sweetener) have been granted GRAS status with some exceptions.66  
B. The New Nutrition Facts Panel 
The NLEA gives the FDA authority to require nutrition labeling on food 
packaging.67 When the FDA developed the NFP, it initially determined that sugar 
need not be included. But because the FDA received extensive comments 
questioning this decision, the final regulations included a total, but not added, sugar 
disclosure requirement.68 During the NLEA proceedings, the FDA established a 
daily reference value for food components to recommend, e.g., fiber, or limit, e.g., 
saturated fat, but it did not establish a recommended limit for sugar or added sugar.69 
This changed in 2016 with the introduction of legislation to update the NFP. 
Congress passed legislation to update the NFP in 2016, and compliance 
with the new regulation began in January 2020.70 The updated nutrition labeling 
regulation requires a declaration of added sugars under total sugars and includes a 
required daily reference value for added sugar.71 The FDA based its labeling 
modification on the 2010 Dietary Guidelines, which state that solid fats and added 
 
 63. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 64. Id. 
 65. See 21 C.F.R. § 184.1854(a) (2009); id. § 184.1866 (High Fructose Corn Syrup 
FDA GRAS approval); see also Lustig et al., supra note 14; High Fructose Corn Syrup 
Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/food-
additives-petitions/high-fructose-corn-syrup-questions-and-answers (last updated Jan. 4, 
2018). 
 66. See High-Intensity Sweeteners, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 19, 2014), 
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-additives-petitions/high-intensity-sweeteners. 
 67. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(2)(A) (2010). 
 68. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, The Bittersweet Truth About Sugar Labeling 
Regulations: They Are Achievable and Overdue, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e14, e14 (2012).  
 69. Food Labeling; Reference Daily Intakes and Daily Reference Values, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 2,206, 2,217, 2,222–23 (Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101, 104).  
 70. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 
Fed. Reg. 33,742, 33,758 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 101). 
 71. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
NUTRITION AND SUPPLEMENT FACTS LABELS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE 
COMPLIANCE DATE, ADDED SUGARS, AND DECLARATION OF QUANTITATIVE AMOUNTS OF 
VITAMINS AND MINERALS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 4 (2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/117402/download [hereinafter NUTRITION AND SUPPLEMENT]. 
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sugars contribute to excess caloric intake.72 The updated NFP was developed to 
provide “updated nutrition information on the label to assist consumers in 
maintaining healthy dietary practices.”73 A more subtle goal is made in the  preamble 
to the proposed rule: “The mandatory declaration of added sugars may also prompt 
product reformulation of foods high in added sugars like what was seen when trans-
fat labeling was mandated.”74 The FDA makes the manufacturer responsible for 
ensuring the validity of the nutrient values stated on a product’s label and for 
determining how to calculate nutrition values required by the NLEA.75 The FDA 
enforces labeling requirements by random sampling and requires values to be 
accurate within a preestablished percentage.76 In the United States, it is illegal to 
introduce misbranded food into the marketplace, and the FDA is responsible for 
enforcing this regulation.77 
Importantly, for the first time in history, the NFP provides a daily reference 
value for added sugars. This goes farther than the European Union, which only sets 
a daily reference amount for sugars. The European Commission published a 
regulation (“Food Information Regulation”) in 2013 on the provision of food 
information to consumers applicable to all member states in the European Union.78 
This European nutrition-labeling mandate required that prepacked and non-
prepacked foods display certain information starting in 2016, and it included a daily 
reference amount for sugar (90 grams), but it contained nothing specifically for 
added sugars.79 
In the promulgation of the final rule, discussed later, the FDA responded 
to several industry comments on legal issues.80 The industry challenged the federal 
rules as compelled commercial speech, but the government contended that the 
disclosure of factual information in commercial speech is allowed “as long as the 
disclosure provides accurate, factual information; is not unjustified or unduly 
 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIETARY 
GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS 27 (7th ed. 2010), https://health.gov/our-work/food-
nutrition/previous-dietary-guidelines/2010. 
 73. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 
Fed. Reg. 33,742, 33,742 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 74. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 79 
Fed. Reg. 11,880, 11,904 (Mar. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). Reformulation 
is defined as “the process of altering a food or beverage product's recipe or composition to 
improve the product's health profile.” C. Scott et al., Food and Beverage Product 
Reformulation as a Corporate Political Strategy, 172 SOC. SCI. & MED. 37, 37 (2017). 
 75. See NUTRITION AND SUPPLEMENT, supra note 71, at 6–7. 
 76. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 56, at 31. 
 77. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2018). 
 78. See Council Directive 90/496, 1990 O.J. (L 276) 40, 42 (EC); see also 
European Parliament and Council Regulation 1169/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 18 (EU); 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/13, 2000 O.J. (L 109) 29 (EC). 
 79. See Enforcement of EU Food Labeling Law—Are You Ready?, SGS (Sept. 28, 
2016), https://www.sgs.com/en/news/2016/09/enforcement-of-eu-food-labeling-law-are-
you-ready. 
 80. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 
Fed. Reg. 33,742, 33,758 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 101). 
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burdensome; and ‘reasonably relate[s]’81 to a government interest.”82 As 
justification for the particularities of the rule, the FDA conducted four consumer 
studies to evaluate consumer responses to added-sugar information, and then, it 
reopened the comment period after it completed the second set of studies.83 The 
FDA maintains that its authority in this matter derives from the FDCA in accordance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).84 
The American Heart Association (“AHA”) recommended that Americans 
lower their added sugar intake in 200985 based on new evidence that emerged since 
their previous scientific statement given in 2002. In the 2009 scientific statement, 
the AHA observed that U.S. food labels did not, at the time, distinguish between 
sugars naturally present in food and added sugars.86 The current U.S. dietary 
guidelines recommend fewer than 300 calories a day in a 2,000 calorie diet to come 
from foods that do not contain many nutrients, such as candies, baked goods, and 
other treats, in which added sugars are traditionally high.87 
At first, the Consumer Brands Association, formerly known as the Grocery 
Manufacturers Association, opposed the rule, but eventually it supported the final 
form.88 The Sugar Association remains opposed to this regulation and has raised 
concerns over allegedly scapegoating sugar in the battle against excessive caloric 
consumption.89 It also argued that the scientific evidence90 connecting disease to 
sugar may be lacking, specifically pointing to evidence that links lifestyle choices 
to disease rather than sugar;91 however, these studies commissioned by the Sugar 
 
 81. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 82. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 81 
Fed. Reg. at 33,758 (May 27, 2016) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 101). 
 83. Id. at 33,751. 
 84. Id. at 33,770 (referencing § 403 of the FDCA as basis for authority). 
 85. Johnson et al., supra note 30, at 1016. 
 86. Id. at 1012. 
 87. See generally BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 29. 
 88. See Dan Charles, An ‘Added Sugar’ Label Is On the Way for Packaged Food, 
NPR: THE SALT (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/05/20/478837157/the-added-sugar-label-is-
coming-to-a-packaged-food-near-you. 
 89. See The Sugar Association Statement on FDA’s ‘Added Sugars’ Declaration, 
CISION PR NEWSWIRE (May 20, 2016), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-
sugar-association-statement-on-fdas-added-sugars-declaration-300272636.html. 
 90. See Suzanne P. Murphy & Rachel K. Johnson, The Scientific Basis of Recent 
US Guidance on Sugars Intake, 78 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 827S, 830S–32S (2003). 
 91. See Angela D. Liese et al., The Dietary Patterns Methods Project: Synthesis 
of Findings Across Cohorts and Relevance to Dietary Guidance, 145 J. NUTRITION 393, 393–
94 (2015); Jill Reedy et al., Higher Diet Quality Is Associated with Decreased Risk of All-
Cause, Cardiovascular Disease, and Cancer Mortality Among Older Adults, 144 J. 
NUTRITION 881, 881–82 (2014). See generally NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LIFESTYLE INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE CARDIOVASCULAR RISK: 
SYSTEMATIC EVIDENCE REVIEW FROM THE LIFESTYLE WORK GROUP (2013), 
https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/sites/default/files/media/docs/lifestyle.pdf. 
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Association have been decried as biased.92 Several leading studies and books have 
shown that the sugar industry has hidden vital information on the dangers associated 
with sugar from the public.93 One article reviewed 60 studies between 2001 and 
2016 that looked at whether sugary drinks contribute to obesity or diabetes.94 Of the 
26 studies that found no link, almost all were funded by the sugar-sweetened 
beverage industry or conducted by people with financial ties to the industry.95 Of 
the 34 studies that found a link, just 1 was funded by the beverage industry; the rest 
were independently funded.96 Not only did the sugar industry fund studies to show 
that there was no link between negative public health outcomes and sugar, but also 
the industry tried to shift attention from sugar to fat as a culprit. One study showed 
that the Sugar Research Foundation, which later became the Sugar Association, 
“recognized as early as 1954 that if Americans adopted low-fat diets [which it later 
promoted], then per-capita consumption of sucrose would increase by more than 
one-third.”97 
The original compliance dates for the NFP were established two to three 
years after the final rule’s effective date; however, the date varied depending on the 
annual sales that a manufacturer reports.98 The FDA later postponed the compliance 
dates for the added-sugar portion of the final rule from July 26, 2018, to January 1, 
2020, for manufacturers with $10 million or more in annual sales.99 For 
manufacturers with less than $10 million in annual sales, the compliance date was 
moved from July 26, 2019, to January 1, 2021.100 The compliance dates were 
extended because of a perceived need to give the industry time to update their labels 
 
 92. See Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/how-the-sugar-
industry-shifted-blame-to-fat.html; see also Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., Financial Conflicts of 
Interest and Reporting Bias Regarding the Association Between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages 
and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, 10 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2013). 
 93. See generally MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS 
HOOKED US (2013). 
 94. See Dean Schillinger et al., Do Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Cause Obesity 
and Diabetes? Industry and the Manufacture of Scientific Controversy, 165 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 895, 895 (2016), https://annals.org/aim/article-abstract/2578450/do-sugar-
sweetened-beverages-cause-obesity-diabetes-industry-manufacture-scientific. 
 95. Id. at 896. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Elizabeth Fernandez, Sugar Papers Review Industry Role in Shifting National 
Heart Disease Focus to Saturated Fat, UCSF (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2016/09/404081/sugar-papers-reveal-industry-role-shifting-
national-heart-disease-focus. 
 98. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 83 
Fed. Reg. 19,619, 19,623 (May 4, 2018) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 101). 
 99. FDA Extends Nutritional Facts Label Compliance Dates, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (May 3, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-extends-
nutrition-facts-label-compliance-dates. 
 100. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels; 
Technical Amendments, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,493, 65,494 (Dec. 21, 2018) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R pt. 101). 
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and comply with the final rules.101 The FDA issued guidance for industries to further 
explain its reasoning and remedy certain questions and concerns.102 Additionally, 
the FDA stated that it plans to work with manufacturers for the first six months 
following the compliance date rather than focus on enforcement.103 
 
C. Nutrient-Content Claims, Disclosure Statements, Health Claims 
Food manufacturers make claims, like “just a tad sweet” and “sorta sweet,” 
on packages of foods that contain high levels of added sugars. Typically, the FDA 
uses nutrient-content claims, disclosure statements, and health claims to inform 
consumers about added sugars and close any avenues companies may seek to 
mislead consumers. The problem is that currently these regulatory avenues are not 
functioning.  
Nutrient-content claims for sugar were developed to prevent consumers 
from being deceived when the absence (or minimal amount) of sugars does not 
indicate “a product which is low in calories or significantly reduced in calories.”104 
These regulations set the boundaries of when “[a] claim about the calorie or sugar 
content of a food may [only] be made on the label.”105 The NLEA defines a “nutrient 
content claim” as any claim that expressly or impliedly “characterizes the level of 
any nutrient.”106 The NLEA also requires that the FDA define certain absolute and 
relative terms to characterize the level of nutrient in a food. For instance, “Absolute” 
terms, such as  “low,” “high,” or “lean,” define  nutritional quality in one serving of 
a food.107 “Relative” or similar terms such as “less,” “reduced,” or “more,” are used 
to compare nutritional quality  in one food compared to nutritional quality in another 
food.108 Only these terms or certain synonyms for these defined terms can be used.109 
The FDCA stipulates that no such claims may be made unless the FDA has defined 
the claim in regulations and the food meets the requirements of the regulations.110 
The problem is that “just a tad sweet” or “sorta sweet” fall outside of the FDA-
regulated claims because they are not defined by the FDA. Both the FTC and the 
FDA regulate nutrient-content claims, but the FTC has previously indicated that 
where a claim is subject to the joint jurisdiction of the FTC and the FDA, it will 
accord significant deference to the FDA’s standards.111 
 
 101. Food Labeling: Revision of the Nutrition and Supplement Facts Labels, 83 
Fed. Reg. at 19,622 (May 4, 2018) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 101). 
 102. Industry Resources on the Changes to the Nutrition Facts Label, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/industry-resources-
changes-nutrition-facts-label (last updated Mar. 26, 2020). 
 103. See id. 
 104. 21 C.F.R. § 101.60(c)(1) (2020). 
 105. Id. § 101.60(a). 
 106. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(A) (Supp. 1990).  
 107. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b) (2020). 
 108. Id. § 101.13(j). 
 109. Id. § 101.13(b)(4). Interested parties may petition FDA to authorize additional 
synonyms. Id. § 101.69(b)(2). 
 110. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
 111. See generally In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984).  
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If the term “just a tad sweet” is not a nutrient-content claim, then the term 
could be an implied “low sugar” claim. As defined in the FDA regulations:  
An implied nutrient content claim is a claim that: (i) [d]escribes the 
food or an ingredient therein in a manner that suggests that a nutrient 
is absent or present in a certain amount (e.g., ““high in oat bran”); or 
(ii) [s]uggests that the food, because of its nutrient content, may be 
useful in maintaining healthy dietary practices and is made in 
association with an explicit claim or statement about a nutrient (e.g., 
“healthy, contains 3 grams (g) of fat”).112  
The problem is that “low sugar” claims are also absent from the regulations. 
While the FDA has defined some nutrient-content claims for sugar,113 the FDA has 
not defined or authorized the claim for “low sugar.” The use of a nondefined claim 
falls under “misbranding.” And so, the use of an implied claim that is not defined 
also misbrands the product.114 Representations that characterize the level of a 
nutrient are specifically limited and can only be made in accordance with an 
authorizing regulation.115 Because “low sugar” claims have never been authorized, 
they are prohibited.116 
A “no added sugar,” “without added sugar,” or “no sugar added” claim may 
be used only if no amount of sugar is added or no ingredient that “contains sugars 
that functionally substitute for added sugars is added (e.g., fruit juice).” 117 
Ingredients that contain added sugars, such as jam or jelly, also count as added 
sugars.118 In addition, the food cannot have been processed to increase the sugar 
content, such as by the use of enzymes.119 Finally, the claim may only be made when 
“the food that it resembles and for which it substitutes normally contains added 
sugars.”120 If the food does not meet the definition of “low calorie” or “calorie 
reduced,” then the label must “direct[] consumers’ attention to the nutrition panel 
for further information on sugar and calorie content.”121 Meanwhile, “reduced 
sugar” claims may be made only if the product meets certain requirements and the 
label includes specific disclosures.122 Because the products listed in many of the 
implied “low sugar” claims do not claim to have no sugar, the nutrient-content claim 
of “sugar free”123 does not apply. 
 
 112. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b)(2) (2020). 
 113. Id. § 101.60(c). 
 114. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, 58 Fed. Reg. 2,302, 2,303, 2,335 
(Jan. 6, 1993) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 5, 101). 
 117. Id. at 2,326–27. 
 118. Id. at 2,327.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. “Reduced sugar” claims must have at least 25% less sugars per serving 
compared to a standard serving size of the traditional variety. Id. at 2,350. 
 123. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.60(c)(1) (2020) (requiring less than 0.5 gram of sugars 
per reference amount customarily consumed and per labeled serving). 
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Disclosure statements and health claims do not play a role in helping 
consumers understand their sugar intake; but they can in the future. A disclosure 
statement is a warning that high levels of a nutrient are found in the package. There 
are products that require warning statements, such as shell eggs, unpasteurized fruit, 
and vegetable juices.124 When a food bearing a nutrient-content claim contains a 
macronutrient at a level that is associated with an increased risk of disease or health 
problems, the food must bear a disclosure statement: “see nutrition information for 
__ content” with the blank identifying the nutrient exceeding the specified level. For 
example, a disclosure statement may state “see nutrition information for sodium 
content.” There is no disclosure statement for sugar,125 and the FDA should create 
one. 
A “health claim” is defined as any claim that characterizes the relationship 
of any nutrient to a “disease or health related condition.”126 When the NLEA was 
drafted in 1990, the FDA established criteria for manufacturers to make health 
claims; that is, manufacturers could not claim that food was healthy if it contained 
“disqualifying nutrient levels” of total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, or sodium above 
levels required to make a health claim.127 Problematically, sugar was not included 
in these disqualifying criteria, and the FDA should include added sugar in these 
standards. 
In sum, given that the new NFP includes added sugar with a daily reference 
amount, health claim regulations and disclosure regulations can be modified to 
include added sugar as a disqualifying nutrient level to trigger disclosure statements. 
A “low sugar” claim can be defined to prevent implied “low sugar” claims. 
II. DEMAND FOR MORE SUGAR REGULATION 
Recent litigation suggests that consumers demand more nutritional labeling 
on the front of the package beyond the mandatory rules governing the NFP and 
nutrient-content or health claims. Pressure for a consistent federal approach to 
nutritional labeling comes from both local U.S. regulators who have experimented 
with local taxes to curb demand for sugar-sweetened beverages and from foreign 
governments, e.g., Chile, that have experimented with plain-packaging rules to curb 
demand for unhealthy foods. Each pressure point will be discussed in turn. 
A. Taxes 
Local government experimentation with taxes and other initiatives to curb 
added-sugar consumption has been on the rise and with it so have preemptive 
responses by states. This notable attention to added-sugar consumption provides 
momentum for a federal approach to address added sugar. FOP nutritional labeling 
to alert consumers of added sugars is something that can curb added-sugar 
consumption. Not only do the tax initiatives represent regulatory interest in pursuing 
 
 124. Id. § 101.17(g)–(h); see also NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION 53–54 (2d 
ed. 2010) (the warning statement for pasteurized juices is, for example: “WARNING: This 
product has not been pasteurized and, therefore, may contain harmful bacteria that can cause 
serious illness in children, the elderly, and persons with weakened immune systems”). 
 125. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(h) (2020). 
 126. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(B) (Supp. 1990). 
 127. 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1), (4) (2020). 
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more nutritional nudges but also the preemption movement against the local taxes 
and warning labels indicates that a federal approach is preferred to a local, 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach. 
A number of U.S. jurisdictions currently tax sugar-sweetened beverages 
(“SSBs”) in some form. These taxes can be divided into two broad categories: (1) 
state-wide taxes that have existed for decades and are disconnected from efforts to 
combat obesity; and (2) recent taxes, mainly on the city level, explicitly designed to 
combat obesity. A few states have long-established taxes on SSBs that are 
disconnected from the modern movement aimed at combatting obesity. In 1951, 
West Virginia implemented a $0.01 per serving tax on soda, stipulating that the 
proceeds be used to fund medical, dentistry, and nursing schools.128 In 1987, 
Tennessee enacted an excise tax on wholesalers of 1.9% of sales derived from 
bottled soft drinks, with the proceeds to be used for the state highway fund.129 In 
1992, Arkansas implemented a sales tax of $20.60 per gallon ($0.16 per ounce) on 
soft drinks, with funds directed toward the state match of federal Medicaid funds.130 
In 2002, Virginia levied an excise tax on wholesalers and distributors, although the 
amount is so small as to be insignificant ($7,200 total tax for sales between $10 
million and $25 million).131 
Recently, taxes on SSBs directly aimed at reducing obesity have been 
enacted in nine cities, one state, and one tribal jurisdiction. Between 2015 and 2019, 
SSB taxes have gone into effect in nine U.S. jurisdictions: (1) Berkeley, California 
(2015);132 (2) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (2017);133 (3) Boulder, Colorado 
(2017);134 (4) Oakland, California (2017);135 (5) Albany, California (2017);136 (6) 
Cook County, Illinois (2017, repealed 2017);137 (7) Seattle, Washington (2017);138 
(8) San Francisco, California (2018);139 and (9) Washington, D.C. (2019).140 These 
taxes are generally targeted at reducing sugar consumption for reasons of public 
health and are generally imposed as a fixed amount per fluid ounce of soda sold. 
These amounts range from $0.01 per ounce to $0.02 per ounce, with most cities 
taxing at $0.01 per ounce. Of the nine cities, only Washington, D.C., taxes as a 
percentage of the sale price. The D.C. tax is an 8% sales tax on soft drinks compared 
to a 6% sales tax on other taxable items. Generally, these taxes only apply to 
beverages sweetened with “caloric sweeteners,” such as sugar or high-fructose corn 
syrup. Two of the cities (Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.) apply the tax to both 
 
 128. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-19-2(1) (West 2020). 
 129. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-402(b)(1) (West 2020). 
 130. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-57-904(a)(3)(A), 26-57-908 (West 2020).  
 131. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1702 (West 2020). 
 132. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 7,388-N.S. (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 133. PHILA., PA., CODE § 19-4103(1) (2016). 
 134. BOULDER, COLO., MUN. CODE § 3-16-2(a) (2017). 
 135. OAKLAND, CAL., CODE ch. 4.52 (2016).  
 136. ALBANY, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4-13 (2016).  
 137. Cook Cnty, Ill., Ordinance 16-5931 (Nov. 10, 2016) (repealed 2017); see also 
Cook County Board Overwhelmingly Votes to Repeal Soda Tax, CBS CHICAGO (Oct. 11, 
2017), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2017/10/11/sweetened-beverage-tax-repealed/.  
 138. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125,324 (June 6, 2017).  
 139. S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 8, § 553(a) (2016). 
 140. D.C., CODE § 47-2002(a)(8) (2019). 
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caloric sweeteners and zero-calorie artificial sweeteners. On the state level, Vermont 
enacted a 6% sales tax on soft drinks in 2015, and the tax included artificially 
sweetened beverages in an explicit attempt to improve public health.141 In 2014, the 
Navajo Nation’s “junk food tax” imposed a sales tax of 2% on all food items of 
“minimal-to-no nutritional value,” including soda.142 
Other jurisdictions have recently proposed taxes on SSBs or have recently 
defeated such measures. In 2019, Connecticut’s Governor included a $0.015 per 
ounce state-wide tax in his budget proposal,143 but it was not included in the final 
budget.144 In a 2017 referendum, Santa Fe, New Mexico, voters rejected a $0.02 per 
ounce tax.145 In 2018, Rhode Island lawmakers unsuccessfully proposed a tax 
ranging from $0.01 to $0.02 per ounce depending on the sugar content of the 
drink.146 In 2019, Massachusetts lawmakers introduced a $0.01 per ounce tax 
proposal.147 
The beverage industry has successfully mobilized against the soda tax 
movement by framing soda taxes more broadly as taxes on “groceries” and passing 
state laws restricting the ability of local governments to implement such taxes. In 
2018, after several California cities passed soda taxes, the legislature passed a state-
wide measure backed by the American Beverage Association prohibiting the 
imposition of new local taxes on “groceries” until 2030.148 A 2017 Michigan law 
preempts local governments from taxing “food,” including soda.149 In 2018, an 
Arizona law was passed requiring local governments to tax all food items (including 
soda) equally.150 In a 2018 ballot initiative, Washington voters approved a measure 
 
 141. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 9701(31), 9741(13) (West 2020). 
 142. Council Res. CN-54-14 § 1005, 22nd Council, 4th Year (Navajo Nation 2014). 
 143. See Christopher Keating, A Soda Tax Could Raise $163M a Year for 
Connecticut. Opponents Say It Would Be an Unfair Burden on Businesses and Families, 
HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.courant.com/politics/hc-pol-clb-soda-tax-
details-20190416-qgtphdglx5h6jegfbwa2e4rnpm-story.html. 
 144. See Christopher Keating, Gov. Ned Lamont, Lawmakers Announce Deal on 
Two-Year, $43 Billion Budget, HARTFORD COURANT (May 30, 2019), https://www.courant.
com/politics/hc-pol-state-budget-close-20190530-p47e6cvbqjfx3kjidaqnoo6rki-story.html. 
 145. See T.S. Last, Soda Tax Goes Flat in Santa Fe, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 3, 
2017), https://www.abqjournal.com/997373/early-returns-are-against-sugary-drinks-
tax.html. 
 146. S. 2196, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2018). 
 147. See Mike Masciadrelli, Massachusetts Considering Taxing Sugary Drinks to 
Fight Childhood Obesity, WWLP 22 NEWS (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.wwlp.com
/news/health/massachusetts-considering-taxing-sugary-drinks-to-fight-childhood-obesity/. 
 148. A.B. 1838, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); see also Alexei Koseff, 
California Bans Local Soda Taxes Through 2030 to Avert Industry-Backed Initiative, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (June 29, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y2fs93ov.  
 149. H.B. 4999, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017). 
 150. H.B. 2484, 53rd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018). 
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that prevents local governments from taxing groceries.151 In a defeat to the beverage 
industry, Oregon voters rejected a similar referendum in 2018.152 
Given that SSBs are a hotly debated topic across the United States, are SSB 
taxes effective? Taxes on SSBs appear to correlate with modest decreases in 
consumption. In the United States, only Berkeley and Philadelphia appear to have 
been studied. Few of the studies measure the effect of the taxes directly using store-
level purchase data (scanner data). Studies based on consumer surveys appear to be 
more prevalent, but those studies may be less dependable as they rely only on 
consumer’s beliefs about their consumption preferences and habits. Studies using 
scanner data seem to predict a smaller effect of the taxes, while studies using survey 
data predict larger effects. 
In Berkeley, studies where scanner data is available show that the taxes 
have at best a modest effect. One such study, using data from stores both in Berkeley 
and in untaxed control municipalities surrounding Berkeley, found that SSB sales 
inside of the taxed area decreased by 9.6%.153 However, the decrease was offset in 
large part as sales outside of the taxed area increased by 6.9%.154 In a recent working 
paper, also using scanner data, there was conflicting evidence that the tax was 
effective in decreasing SSB consumption.155 Other studies in Berkeley have relied 
on survey data rather than store-level scanner data. In two such studies, SSB 
consumption in Berkeley decreased significantly.156 Another study based on prices 
collected from stores before and after the imposition of the Berkeley tax found that 
43.1% of the tax was passed on to consumers.157 
In Philadelphia, studies using both scanner data and survey data show 
larger decreases in SSB consumption but also indicate that the tax may 
disproportionately impact low-income communities. In a working paper using 
scanner-level data, the price of SSBs in the taxed area increased by 34%, while 
 
 151. Initiative Measure No. 1634 (Wash. 2018), 
https://www.sos.wa.gov//_assets/elections/initiatives/finaltext_1513.pdf; Julia Belluz, Coca-
Cola and Pepsi’s Deceptive Tactic to Stop Soda Taxes Worked in Washington State, VOX 
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/7/18069890/washington-
initiative-1634-results-soda-grocery-tax. 
 152. See Dirk VanderHart, Oregon Voters Reject Measure to Ban Grocery Taxes, 
OR. PUB. BROAD. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-measure-103-
grocery-tax-results/. 
 153. Lynn D. Silver et al., Changes in Prices, Sales, Consumer Spending, and 
Beverage Consumption One Year After a Tax on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages in Berkeley, 
California, US: A Before-and-After Study, PLOS MED., Apr. 18, 2017, at 1–2. 
 154. Id.  
 155. See Christian Rojas & Emily Yucai Wang, UNIV. MASS.: AMHERST, Do Taxes 
for Soda and Sugary Drinks Work? Scanner Data Evidence from Berkeley and Washington 
(2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3041989. 
 156. Jennifer Falbe et al., Impact of the Berkeley Excise Tax on Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverage Consumption, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1865, 1865 (2016); Matthew Lee et al., 
Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption 3 Years After the Berkeley, California, Sugar-
Sweetened Beverage Tax, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 637, 637 (2019). 
 157. See John Cawley & David Frisvold, The Incidence of Taxes on Sugar-
Sweetened Beverages: The Case of Berkeley, California 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch, 
Working Paper No. 21,465, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21465. 
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demand decreased by 46%.158 Outside of the tax studies, demand increased by 24%, 
but the net decrease was still substantial (22%).159 Studies based on survey data 
found that the chance of daily soda consumption decreased by 40%, while the “30 
day soda consumption frequency was 38% lower.”160 Another survey found that 
purchases of SSBs decreased by 8.9 fluid ounces per shopping trip on average but 
also found that Philadelphia residents increased their purchases of SSBs outside of 
the city.161 A final study found that stores generally pass the tax to customers fully 
but also found that the pass-through rates were higher in low-income neighborhoods, 
independent stores, and stores far from the city limits.162 
Outside of the United States, several countries have shown success with 
sugar-SSB taxes.163 A nationwide study in Mexico used household store purchase 
data before and after a 1 peso per liter tax on SSBs and found that SSB purchases 
decreased by 8.2% on average over two years.164 In Europe, SSB taxes have led food 
and beverage companies to reformulate or alter the recipe or composition of a food 
or beverage product to improve their health profiles.165 Several different approaches 
to nutritional labeling have taken hold in Europe amidst critique that industry self-
regulation used standards too low compared to World Health Organization 
(“WHO”) nutrient-profiling standards.166 In the United Kingdom, an SSB tax and a 
proposed ban on the sale of energy drinks to children are part of a wider set of 
policies in the U.K. government’s 2018 plan of action to combat childhood obesity.” 
The plan sets out the Government’s national ambition to halve childhood obesity by 
2030 and reduce the childhood obesity gap between the most to least deprived 
areas.167 One component of this plan, the U.K. SSB tax, went into effect in April 
 
 158. Stephan Seiler et al., The Impact of Soda Taxes: Pass-Through, Tax 
Avoidance, and Nutritional Effects 30 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper 
No. 19-12, 2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3302335.  
 159. Id. at 30–31.  
 160. Yichen Zhong et al., The Short-Term Impacts of the Philadelphia Beverage 
Tax on Beverage Consumption, 55 AM. J. PREV. MED. 26, 31 (2018). 
 161. See John Cawley et al., The Impact of the Philadelphia Beverage Tax on 
Purchases and Consumption by Adults and Children 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working 
Paper No. 25052, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25052. 
 162. Id. at 26. 
 163. See Rachel Arthur et al., Sugar Taxes: The Global Picture, FOOD NAVIGATOR 
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.foodnavigator-latam.com/Article/2019/12/18/Sugar-taxes-The-
global-picture-in-2019#. 
 164. See M. Arantxa Colchero et al., In Mexico, Evidence of Sustained Consumer 
Response Two Years After Implementing A Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Tax, 36 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 564, 567 (2017). 
         165. See Cherry Law et al., The Impact of UK Soft Drinks Industry Levy on 
Manufacturers’ Domestic Turnover, 37 ECON. & HUMAN BIOLOGY, May 2020, at 7. 
 166. See generally Nutrient Profile Model, WHO REG’L OFFICE FOR EUROPE 
(2015), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/270716/Nutrient-children_
web-new.pdf; Nutrient Profiling: Report of a WHO/IASO Technical Meeting, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 4–6, 2010), http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/profiling/en/ (discussing 
general aspects of nutrient profiling).  
 167. U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. CARE, BANNING THE SALE OF ENERGY DRINKS 
TO CHILDREN IMPACT ASSESSMENT 6 (2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
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2018. Unlike previous SSB taxes which were aimed at decreasing consumption of 
sugary drinks, “the British tax was designed to encourage soda-makers” to alter the 
recipes for their products by reducing the sugar that they use, otherwise known as 
“reformulating” their products.168 The tax encourages “reformulations” by charging 
two separate tax rates based on total sugar content.169 The lower rate of $0.06 per 
serving applies to drinks with roughly 12–19 grams of sugar per 8-ounce can, and 
the higher tax rate of $0.08 per serving applies to drinks with more than 19 grams 
of sugar per can. 170 
Evidence shows that the graduated levy in the United Kingdom has 
prompted some of the country’s largest soda makers to drastically reduce the sugar 
in their beverage: for instance, Coca Cola changed their recipe for Fanta, and San 
Pellegrino sodas in the United Kingdom decreased sugar by 40%.171 In addition to 
these, other sodas like Irn-Bru, Lucozade, and Ribena cut sugar content to levels 
falling right beneath the level of the lowest tax.172 Other companies, like Nichols, 
which makes the popular soda Vimto, are working on shifting their product 
development efforts to low or no sugar drinks. 173 One 2017 British study “modeled 
what would happen if the soda industry cut sugars by between” 15% and 30% and 
found such a change would reduce the number of obese adults in Britain by 144,000, 
resulting in “19,000 fewer annual cases of diabetes.”174 Also in England, the 
Department of Health and Social Care invited comments on a proposal for banning 
the sale of energy drinks to children, citing the effects of sugar and caffeine on 




 168. See Caitlin Dewey, Why the British Soda Tax Might Work Better Than Any of 
the Soda Taxes That Came Before, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/21/why-the-british-soda-tax-
might-work-better-than-any-of-the-soda-taxes-that-came-before-it/.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Ending the Sale of Energy Drinks to Children, DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. CARE 
(Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/ending-the-sale-of-energy-
drinks-to-children. See generally U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. CARE, CONSULTATION ON 
PROPOSAL TO END THE SALE OF ENERGY DRINKS TO CHILDREN (2018), https://assets
.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/73639
8/consultation-on-ending-the-sale-of-energy-drinks-to-children.pdf (requesting comments 
on: (i) “what products should be included in any restrictions;” (ii) “what age limit a ban should 
apply to;” (iii) “whether sales of energy drinks from vending machines should be restricted;” 
and (iv) “whether there are any changes that would be more appropriate than a ban on sales 
to children or that could be applied as well as a ban”). Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
would not be affected by any actions England takes pursuant to the consultation. Id. at 7. 
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B. Warning Statements 
In 2015, San Francisco enacted an ordinance requiring certain 
advertisements for SSBs to carry a warning.176 The requirement applies to print ads, 
billboards, transit, and stadium advertising. The ads are required to carry a warning 
reading, “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to 
obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay” that occupies at least 20% of the advertisement 
space. Studies show that SSB health warning labels improve parent’s understanding 
of the detrimental effects related to overconsumption of these beverages and lead 
them to purchase fewer of these beverages for their children177 Meanwhile, the 
American Beverage Association challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it 
placed an undue burden on their speech. After losing in district court, the Beverage 
Association won a preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit.178 
In commercial context, laws compelling disclosures are permitted when the 
disclosure is: (1) purely factual; (2) noncontroversial; and (3) not unjustified or 
unduly burdensome.179 The court held that the requirement that the warning occupy 
at least 20% of the ad was unjustified because a study presented by the City’s expert 
found that a warning occupying only 10% of the image could be effective.180 As the 
goals of the ordinance could possibly be obtained with a smaller warning, requiring 
that the warning occupy 20% of the ad was unjustifiable.181 Upon determining that 
the requirement failed one prong of the NIFLA test, the court stopped its analysis 
without determining whether the warning label was factual and uncontroversial.182 
However, concurring opinions indicated that the warning may have had difficulty 
clearing those prongs because the ordinance refers to “diabetes” broadly, and sugar 
consumption has only been linked to type-2 diabetes, not type-1 diabetes.183 
Though the San Francisco ordinance failed, legislators within California 
are proposing other bills to enact SSB warnings on packaging. California S.B. 347 
is a proposed bill that would require the placement of warning labels directly on 
SSB containers.184 The bill has passed the California Senate in 2019 but faces 
industry opposition in the State Assembly, causing its sponsor to hold the bill in the 
Assembly until 2020.185 S.B. 347’s warning requirements appear to address some of 
 
 176. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 100-15 (June 1, 2015) (requiring health warnings on 
advertisements for certain sugar-sweetened beverages). 
 177. See, e.g., Christina A. Roberto et al., The Influence of Sugar-Sweetened 
Beverage Health Warning Labels on Parents’ Choices, PEDIATRICS, Feb. 2016, at 1. 
 178. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 757–
58 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 179. Id. at 756 (citing Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 
2361, 2372 (2018)). 
 180. Id. at 756–57. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 765–66 (Christen, J., concurring in part). 
 184. S.B. 347, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://openstates.org
/ca/bills/20192020/SB347/. 
 185. See Patrick McGreevy, How Big Soda Used Its Clout to Stop 5 of 5 California 
Laws to Regulate Sugary Drinks, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.latimes.com
/politics/la-pol-ca-soda-industry-quashes-bills-20190703-story.html. 
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the weaknesses in San Francisco’s ordinance. The bill would require warnings on 
beverage containers reading: “STATE OF CALIFORNIA SAFETY WARNING: 
Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) may contribute to obesity, type 2 diabetes, 
and tooth decay.”186 The limitation of the warning to type-2 diabetes, as well as the 
change from “contributes to” to “may contribute to” makes S.B. 347 less likely to 
be determined to be nonfactual or controversial, although those issues were not 
reached by the Ninth Circuit in the San Francisco decision. 
It is unclear whether the warning would be considered unjustifiable or 
unduly burdensome. The bill sets the requirements on the size of the text in the 
warning (1 millimeter for containers 8 ounces and smaller, 2 millimeters for 
containers between 8 ounces and 1 liter, 3 millimeters for containers 1 liter and 
larger).187 The relative proportion of the label occupied by the warning could vary 
depending on the exact size of the manufacturer’s packages and labels.188 Unlike the 
San Francisco ordinance, S.B. 347 would require a yellow triangle warning symbol, 
the same height as the aggregate height of the text comprising the warning. The 
addition of the yellow warning symbol presents a new variable and thus introduces 
further uncertainty into the constitutionality of S.B. 347. 
California is not the only state to meet resistance to SSB warning bills; 
legislators in other states have proposed unsuccessful SSB warning bills. SSB 
labeling bills have been introduced in Hawaii (S.B. 307, 2017),189 New York (S.B. 
06435, 2016),190 and Washington (H.B. 2798, 2016).191But none of these measures 
advanced past the early stages of the legislative process. All three of the bills 
required warning language that was substantially similar or identical to the language 
required by the San Francisco ordinance and thus might have encountered difficulty 
clearing the purely factual and noncontroversial requirements had they become law. 
None required a special warning symbol as CA S.B. 347 does. Only Hawaii’s bill 
specified the size requirements for the warning which were substantially similar to 
S.B. 347.192 New York and Washington merely required that the warning be 
prominent, conspicuous, and legible.193 
C. Graphic Warnings and Symbols 
Taxes and labeling are two tools that governments have at their disposal to 
curb consumer demand of products that hinder public health. Across the globe, 
another labeling measure, “plain-packaging,” has gained popularity to curb the use 
of another unhealthy product, tobacco. Plain-packaging rules (sometimes called 
“plain-wrappers” rules), require generic or standardized packaging for a consumer 
product, whereby all branding (including colors, logos, imagery, and trademarks) is 
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removed from the FOP label, and manufacturers are permitted to print only the brand 
name on the pack in a standardized size, font, and color. Sometimes “plain-
packaging” rules take the form of graphic warning labels (“GWLs”). Because of 
their success in curbing the use of tobacco, plain-packaging rules are being 
considered in curbing sugar consumption. This section traces the development of 
plain-packaging rules and their deployment in other regulatory contexts. 
Countries adopt these rules by relying on academic studies that point to the 
effects of plain-packaging advertising on consumption.194 For example, two recent 
studies in Canada support the case for plain-packaging and graphic-health warnings 
on alcoholic beverages.195 One study by the University of Halifax claims that 
warning labels and plain packaging on alcohol bottles work in dampening consumer 
interest.196 The 440 study participants were asked to rate a variety of spirit, wine, 
and beer bottles with warning labels covering either 50%, 75%, or 90% of the label 
surface, along with other plain-packaging labels in terms of visual assessment of the 
products.197 Results found that lowest ratings were given to products with larger 
warning labels and those with plain packaging did the best job at focusing 
participants’ attention on the health warning itself. 198 A second study by Health 
Canada found that graphic health warnings on alcoholic beverages were the most 
effective warning labels.199 This study argued that the prevailing approach of using 
low-risk drinking guidelines is not enough and that graphic warnings are necessary 
to address the low level of awareness off the link between alcohol and health.200 
Australia made headlines in 2012 when it became the first country in the 
world to mandate plain packaging for cigarettes.201 For several years, Australia 
remained the only country that had legislated a plain-packaging rule. Recently, more 
countries are implementing or considering plain-packaging laws on tobacco 
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products, including France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Norway, Ireland, 
Hungary, Canada, Turkey, Singapore, South Africa, and others.202 
In the mid-to-late 2000s, many countries pushed tobacco-labeling 
legislation forward in an effort to prevent public-health problems related to tobacco. 
In 2001, Canada became the first country to require GWLs on cigarette packages 
that cover 50% of the front and 50% of the back, with one side in English and one 
side in French.203 Canada also required labeling for various additives and emissions 
in cigarettes, later banning the words “light” and “mild” from packages.204 In 2012, 
Canada implemented stricter rules covering 75% of the front and back of the 
package.205 Canada’s latest regulations, effective as of November 2019,  require only 
plainly packaged cigarettes with warnings.206 Cigarette companies were given a 90-
day grace period to comply, after which only plainly packaged cigarettes could be 
sold.207 Canada has considered labeling individual cigarettes.208 Mexico, meanwhile, 
began implementing GWLs in 2010, introducing additional health warnings over the 
following two years.209 The warnings must cover 30% of the front and 100% of the 
back of each package.210 Although the discussion regarding plain packaging has 
largely been limited to tobacco products, plain packaging is unlikely to remain a 
“tobacco-only” problem.211 
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In many countries, the public health community is calling for similar 
measures for other consumer products, including alcohol, sugary foods and drinks, 
and pharmaceuticals. Chile is at the forefront for plain-packaging rules as they apply 
to foods. Chile is one example of a country which has adopted perhaps the widest 
range of policies in an effort to curb obesity.212 Up “[u]ntil the late 1980s, 
malnutrition was widespread among poor Chileans, especially children,” but 
increased trade and food choice contributed to a rise in obesity, and with it, a series 
of food marketing regulations.213 In the present day, “three-quarters of adults are 
overweight or obese,”, and childhood obesity rates are among the world’s highest, 
with more than “half of 6-year-old children overweight or obese.”214 Because of 
rising obesity rates across all age groups, Chile launched graphic health warnings 
for tobacco in 2006215 followed by warnings for foods high in sugar, salt, and fat in 
2016.216 Figure 1 offers one example of the warning label placed on the front of 
packaged foods, which denotes “alto en,” or in English, “high in sodium,” “high in 
saturated fat,” “high in sugar,” and “high in calories.” Among the many recent food 
marketing regulations in Chile, one regulation bans the use of animated characters 
on foods marketed to children. Mars Incorporated has been asked to remove the 
dancing candies from its M&Ms packaging; Kellogg Inc. has been asked to remove 
iconic cartoon characters such as Tony the Tiger from Frosted Flakes cereal;217 and 
Nestle has been asked to remove the Nesquick bunny from boxes of Nestlé’s 
Nesquik chocolate powder. Only PepsiCo, the maker of Cheetos, and Kellogg, Inc., 
the producer of Frosted Flakes, have filed pending cases in domestic Chilean courts, 
arguing that the regulations infringe on their intellectual property rights.218 
Meanwhile, there is already evidence that these measures may be changing 
behaviors. Nearly 40% of Chilean citizens say they use the symbols to help them 
decide what to buy, and many manufacturers have voluntarily begun to reformulate 
processed foods to have less sugar, salt, and fat. 219 
There is evidence that other countries are considering the Chilean-type 
warnings. In one Canadian study, participants purchased food and snacks in 
scenarios involving different levels of sugar taxes and different types of FOP labels. 
The study included the stop sign labels that Health Canada proposed to warn 
consumers about high levels of sugar, salt, and saturated fat in prepackaged foods.220 
The study results indicate that increasing the price with a tax, and advertising 
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packages with labels showing “high in sugar” lead people to buy snacks and drinks 
with less sugar, sodium, saturated fat and calories.221 This type of “high in” labeling 
was implemented in Chile and is being considered in Canada.222 
The plain-packaging landscape in Latin America has changed since Chile 
began incorporating food products under plain-packaging rules in 2016. Plain-
packaging proposals first appeared in Central and South America in 2008 and 
continued to appear periodically over the next several years, mostly in private-
member bills concerning tobacco in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil.223 These initial 
proposals did not receive much attention given the region’s focus on other regulatory 
measures, including advertising bans, health warnings, and tax increases. But 
political developments in the region, coupled with the approval of plain-packaging 
laws in several European countries and recent court decisions in the United 
Kingdom, have contributed to a rapid increase in plain-packaging proposals for 
tobacco in Latin America. Fourteen different plain-packaging proposals have been 
adopted by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Panamá.224 
III. A NEW TRAFFIC-LIGHT NUTRITION LABEL SOLUTION 
As the spread of diet-related chronic disease encircles the globe, countries 
are reaching for public-health tools that have worked in the past, e.g., plain-package 
labeling used to address tobacco use. Given that individuals with underlying diet-
related chronic diseases are at a higher risk of complications from COVID-19 and 
other viruses compared to those who are deemed healthy,225 these approaches to 
regulate sugar will likely grow in popularity. 
Meanwhile, consumer outrage with deceptive and misleading industry 
advertising—food labels implying that the food is “low in sugar” when the added 
sugars on the nutritional fact panel reveal quite the opposite—will only continue to 
escalate. With misleading claims on the rise, a lack of federal government regulation 
for these claims, and a food industry that is profiting from this inattention, it is time 
for a consistent federal approach to label added sugar on the front of the package. 
Studies show, and experiences suggest, that a simple, color-coded system 
for labeling packaged foods would increases consumers’ attention to the nutritional 
value of their food choices.226 While the NFP can be used to curb diet-related chronic 
disease, there is empirical evidence that FOP labels are seen more often and earlier 
than the currently mandated NFP and that this benefit is due to its placement on the 
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FOP and the design characteristics of the FOP label.227 Studies also show that labels 
can not only inform consumers but also reformulate products.228 
A. Correcting Failed Industry Self-Regulation 
Nutritional labeling in the United States is a mix of mandatory labeling and 
industry voluntary measures. As discussed above, the FDA regulates most packaged 
foods sold in the United States and requires six elements on a food package: name 
of food; net quantity of contents; nutrition facts; ingredient and allergen statement; 
and the name and address of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor.229 From this 
list, manufacturers are only required to display the name of the product and net 
quantity on the FOP label. Sugar content is not displayed on the front but on the side 
of the package on the ingredient list and the NFP. Manufacturers may display 
preapproved nutrient-content claims on the FOP label so long as they conform to 
the FDA requirements. Claims that do not conform to the FDA requirements will 
trigger enforcement actions either by the FDA for misbranding problems or the FDC 
for deceptive-labeling practices. 
With the front of the package left to industry discretion and advertising, it 
was only a matter of time before unregulated nutrition claims began to appear on the 
front of packages. Claims emerged that were company-specific, e.g., Walmart’s 
“Great for You,”230 PepsiCo’s “Smart Choices Made Easy,” and Kraft’s “Sensible 
Solution”; meanwhile, other claims emerged when companies dropped their 
individual claims and opted for an industry-wide nutrition claim, like the 2009 
”Smart Choices” checkmark.231 One problem with these claims, exemplified in the 
“Smart Choices” label, is that the food industry develops them to maximize profits, 
not to signify nutritional quality. Controversy erupted when Lucky Charms Cereal 
was approved to carry a “Smart Choices” icon, despite its 12 grams (48 calories) of 
added sugar per serving. This is the same as over 40% of the serving’s total calories, 
and it is a larger proportion than most popular cookie brands use.232 The controversy 
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led the FDA to declare that it would create its own FOP nutrition program, but it 
never did. 
Instead, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the 
FDA sponsored a study by the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), a program in the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, to first review the FOP 
nutrition-rating systems and symbols and to then consider the potential benefits of a 
single, standardized FOP food-guidance system regulated by the FDA. 233 The IOM 
launched the first phase; however, before it published the results, two leading food 
industry groups, the Grocery Manufacturers of America (“GMA”), now the 
Consumer Brands Association, and the Food Marketing Institute (“FMI”) developed 
an FOP voluntary system to preempt the second phase of the study. 
In 2010, the “Smart Choices” label was replaced by a new, “Facts-Up-
Front” labeling system developed and overseen by the FMI and the GMA with FDA 
approval.234 The “Facts-Up-Front” program calls for an FOP display with icons that 
show four basic nutrients—calories, saturated fat, sodium, and sugars—as a 
consistent set, and where space is limited, only one icon (calories) may be displayed. 
In addition to displaying the basic four nutrients, manufacturers may display as 
many as two “nutrients” from a list of eight: potassium; fiber; vitamin A; vitamin C; 
vitamin D; calcium; iron; and protein. 235 
The “Facts-Up-Front” program emerged in direct response to an IOM 
report recommending front labels emphasize nutrients that consumers should limit 
because of their contribution to diet-related chronic diseases.236 However, this 
industry-developed nutrition labeling program has been criticized for being 
membership-driven and for  allowing manufacturers to select the nutrients they wish 
to highlight.237 Because manufacturers decide how many icons to display (the basic 
four, the basic four plus two additional nutrients, or one single icon), consumers can 
be misled by the varying number of nutritional icons displayed on packages.238 The 
FDA, meanwhile, has offered only slight criticism of the program, communicating 
to the GMA and the FMI that the “Facts-Up-Front” basic icons are nutrient-content 
claims and are subject to the requirements of the FDCA and the FDA’s regulations. 
Federal regulators expressed concern that some manufacturers would display some 
but not all of the four basic icons and communicated to the GMA and FMI that the 
FDA intends to exercise enforcement discretion to ensure that food manufacturers 
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were consistently applying the four basic icons on virtually all eligible products. 239  
Despite these concerns, the FDA has not enforced the display of all four basic icons, 
and the result is that foods in the marketplace display varying numbers of icons. 
Food manufacturers have been picking and choosing which icons to display (for 
example, soda manufacturers are told they only need to display calories), and 
companies can choose what to include or not include on the label, depending on 
packaging space.240 
Several studies point to weaknesses in the “Facts-Up-Front” labeling 
program itself. While some studies cite that too few icons are displayed, others note 
that too many are displayed; the greater number of basic icons creates confusion and 
lowers consumer accuracy in selecting a healthful product.241 Another study found 
that while consumers have a favorable view of the nutritional value of the foods 
containing “Facts-Up-Front” labels, they underestimate the amounts of saturated fat 
and sugar, and overestimate the amounts of fiber and protein in foods.242 Sometimes, 
less-healthy products can seem more healthful by virtue of the information provided 
on the package front, e.g., a product with high saturated fat may not list this nutrient 
icon.243 Another  flaw identified in the studies is that the sugar icon does not include 
added sugar or a percentage value for added sugar, despite those new additions to 
the NFP. Finally, studies show that the “Facts-Up-Front” display is visually 
unappealing because it lacks color to catch the consumer’s attention and is generally 
ineffective at communicating the healthfulness of a product. 244  
D. Designs for a New Front-of-Package Label 
Industry self-regulation has not provided consumers with information they 
seek to make nutritional decisions. Labels that are informed by rigorous consumer 
research are likely more effective to inform consumers and promote healthful food 
choices.245 
Given these shortcomings of the “Facts-Up-Front” system, what is a better 
method for providing nutritional information on the front of the package? There are 
generally two types of labeling approaches: nutrient-specific and nutrient-summary 
labels. Within those two distinctions, nutrient-specific labels can be either numeric 
(similar to “Facts-Up-Front”), color-coded (traffic-light system as seen in the United 
Kingdom), or warning symbols (Chile). Summary labels can be either simple (like 
“Healthy Choice” in the United States) or graded (like NuVal in the United States), 
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as shown by various example in Figure 1. Additionally, Australia and New Zealand 
launched a health star rating summary label in 2014.246 
 
Figure 1: Labeling Approaches Around the Globe 
 
Based on available research and economic theory, this Article recommends 
an FOP traffic-light nutrition label to be placed on the FOP label displaying serving 
size, calories, and amount of sugar, added sugar, fat, and salt of the food. The color-
coded system uses red (for unhealthy), yellow (for questionable), and green (for 
healthy). Traffic-light nutrition labels have been introduced as a simple way to 
indicate the healthiness of a food product, aiming to help consumers make healthier 
food choices.247 Traffic lights summarize key nutritional aspects of packaged foods 
based on information in the NFP, including the amounts and %DV per serving where 
available. Although a variety of FOP systems have emerged, 248 in the United States, 
similar FOP displays include calories, %DV for vitamins and minerals, and weight 
plus %DV for a small set of nutrients (refer to Figure 1 for examples). Unlike the 
more detailed NFPs appearing on the back of food packages, FOP labels are neither 
required on packaged foods in the United States nor are their formats regulated. 
Moreover, FOP labels do not attempt to convey the specific recommendations of the 
USDA’s dietary guidelines for Americans to the same extent as do NFPs. 
Warning labels, like a traffic-light nutritional label, nudge consumers 
toward healthier diets because people tend to pay more attention to negative 
messages than positive ones.249 Behavioral economists have confirmed the principle 
of loss aversion, which means people are predisposed to avoid harm rather than seek 
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gain.250 Without warning labels, people may react reflexively and select foods that 
provide immediate pleasure but cause long-term harm. The food environment is 
increasingly designed with too many stimuli and novel new foods, and an excess of 
complicated information ends up fostering impulsive and unhealthy choices. To 
encourage a change in habits, new cues like warning labels and environments 
conducive to choosing a healthy diet are necessary. 
Overall, European studies confirm that consumers prefer simplified 
information on the front of the package to the more complex nutrition table on the 
back because simpler FOP nutrition information aids faster decisions. In fact, studies 
show that consumers can use FOP labels in effectively selecting healthier food 
options.251 Studies also show that traffic lights (using colors or words to indicate 
whether levels of three or four nutrients are high, medium, or low) best communicate 
nutritional knowledge and label perceptions when compared to the “Facts-Up-
Front” system.252 The FDA exhibited interest in researching the British traffic-light 
labeling system in 2009,253 but U.S. food-industry members resisted such a 
display.254 
The United Kingdom introduced traffic-light labels in 2013, but labels are 
optional for food manufacturers, and only two-thirds of products in the United 
Kingdom display them.255 The traffic-light labels indicate the levels of four key 
nutrients, i.e., fat, sugar, saturates, and salt, commonly contained in processed food, 
with red indicating a high level, amber a medium level, and green a low level of the 
respective nutrient. Research findings suggest that traffic-light nutrition labels 
improve people’s accuracy in estimation of foods’ healthiness.256 However, findings 
on the effectiveness of traffic-light nutrition labels in promoting healthy eating are 
mixed. Whereas some studies suggest that traffic-light labels can encourage 
healthier eating behavior, 257 other studies do not find any effects of traffic-light 
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labels on sales or consumption of healthy food.258 Studies done in Canada,259 
Australia,260 Germany,261 and a few done in the United States262 all conclude that 
traffic-light food labels work in providing consumers with information to make 
healthier choices. The latest 2020 study using 173 Austrian subjects compared the 
“Facts-Up-Front” system with a traffic light system and found that the traffic-light 
system was more effective than the “Facts-Up-Front” in communicating the 
perceived healthfulness of the product.263 Subjects were presented with the amount 
of sugar contained in products on labels with or without traffic-light colors, and the 
results suggested that the traffic-light labels (using the U.K. Food Standards Agency 
traffic label) helped participants differentiate between the healthiness of products 
with different sugar levels.264 
Studies have also found that consumers perceived products with FOP 
symbols as more healthful and lower in negative nutrients and that these symbols 
failed to help consumers discriminate between healthier and less healthy food 
choices.265 One experimental study used 3,000 Canadians to test consumer 
responses to different FOP symbols on a frozen meal.266 This study also showed that 
absent an NFP, consumers perceived products with FOP symbols to have higher 
nutritional quality.267 Another study showed that consumers perceive Canadian 
products carrying FOP nutrition claims to have a “healthier” profile than their 
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counterparts without such claims even if those counterparts are not nutritionally 
inferior.268 
Policies such as informational campaigns and nutritional labeling are 
policies that are tailored for rational actors.269 This is especially prevalent for food 
marketed to children in which a character adorns a high-sugar product and a health 
claim appeases a parent who might otherwise be hesitant to purchase the product.270 
Given the research on the successes with traffic-light labeling, the FDA could follow 
the IOM’s recommendation to require the food industry to display added sugars with 
nutritional information on the front of the package.271 This first recommendation 
would require rulemaking since the FDCA only requires the name of the product 
and net quantity from manufacturers on the front label. However, with local 
jurisdictions adopting sugar sweetened beverage taxes, and some states preempting 
them, there is a market failure. Moreover, with some countries adopting plain 
packaging for unhealthy foods and many others adopting traffic-light labeling, there 
is an impetus for regulation in this area. A mandatory policy is not as palpable as a 
voluntary policy, but voluntary efforts have not worked. There is consumer interest 
in this area, and there is precedent for rulemaking, given that the federal government 
is only beginning to implement the NFP legislation. Finally, industry may see it in 
its best interest to support a consistent regulation rather than having to continually 
draft an improved label. In the end, a traffic-light nutrition label could potentially 
force companies to compete with each other even more and force reformulation of 
packaged foods. 
Other policy options are possible, but they will not solve the larger problem 
that added-sugar risk communication through industry self-regulation is failing, and 
a lack of federal regulation hinders more efficient and effective communication on 
the front of the food package. The following is a list of solutions that may 
temporarily ease the symptoms: (1) the FDA collaborating with the food industry to 
develop a traffic-light nutrition label; (2) the FDA defining a “low added sugars” 
similar to other “low”-nutrient-content claims with a %DV reference value for added 
sugar found on the NFP; (3) the FDA enforcing misleading information since the 
updated NFP regulation also established a daily value for added sugars; and (4) the 
FDA adding a disqualifying level of added sugar for health claims (like those for 
salt and fat) to eliminate the possibility that foods high in added sugars bear health 
claims. 
IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES WITH THE NEW LABEL 
A traffic-light-indicator label is designed to nudge consumers to more 
healthful habits and influence companies to reformulate their recipes. When 
threatened with legislation that will restrict food advertising by limiting influential 
 
 268. See id. at 12–13. 
 269. Peggy J. Liu et al., Using Behavioral Economics to Design More Effective 
Food Policies to Address Obesity, 36 APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y 6, 6–7 (2013). 
 270. See Jennifer Harris et al., Nutrition-Related Claims on Children’s Cereals: 
What Do They Mean to Parents and Do They Influence Willingness to Buy?, 14 PUB.  HEALTH 
NUTRITION 2207, 2207–09 (2011). 
 271. See Shelley McGuire, Front-of-Package Nutrition Rating Systems and 
Symbols: Promoting Healthier Choices, 3(3) ADVANCES IN NUTRITION 332, 332–33 (2012). 
720 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 62:683 
messages on product packaging, labeling, brand advertising, and sponsorship, 
companies will litigate. Fortunately, the legislative history of the NFP provides 
guidance on the arguments the food industry may raise. 
In the notice and comment period, the FDA defended the added sugar 
disclosure in the NFP legislation against legal challenge from First Amendment 
claims raised by the food industry. The food industry may raise similar challenges 
when faced with a new federal regulation for a traffic-light nutritional labeling, but 
the fact that the traffic-light indicator may be on the FOP, taking direct advertising 
space from the brand, raises a new set of legal challenges different from the previous 
NFP regulation. For this reason, it is helpful to examine other contexts where 
regulators imposed mandatory labels on the FOP for public health reasons. For 
instance, the food industry may raise claims similar to those brought by the tobacco 
industry when countries moved to enact mandatory plain-packaging rules for 
tobacco that limited the FOP advertising space. The following sections present likely 
challenges prominent food companies, e.g., Frito Lay, Pepsi, and Coke, may raise 
against the traffic-light label and their potential for success in domestic courts, 
arbitration, and World Trade Organization (“WTO”) proceedings. 
Before continuing, it is worth noting that the food industry is a diverse 
group of industry participants, and some companies may decide not to litigate, 
opting instead for a consistent federal labeling approach. Moreover, over the last 
few years, we have discovered that the food industry is deeply divided on nutrition 
labeling. In 2018, Danone North America and several other major food companies 
withdrew from the GMA, citing differences with GMA opposition to the listing of 
added sugars on the NFP, and other reasons.272 Mars and Nestlé were two companies 
that openly disagreed with GMA opposition on these issues. 273 
A. United States Courts 
For a glimpse into the arguments which may be raised in the domestic 
context, we need only look at two sources: (1) challenges brought previously in the 
NFP legislation; and (2) the current discussion on the new, March 2020 FDA rule 
imposing plain-packaging graphic warnings on cigarette labels.274 
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First, similar to the 2016 NFP legislation, the traffic-light-indicator label 
could be challenged in domestic court using First Amendment protected commercial 
speech claims. As noted earlier, in the promulgation of the final NFP rule, the FDA 
responded to a number of industry comments on legal issues.275 Industry challenged 
the federal rules as compelled commercial speech, but the government contended 
that the disclosure of factual information in commercial speech is allowed “as long 
as the disclosure provides accurate, factual information; is not unjustified or unduly 
burdensome; and ‘reasonably relate[s]’276 to a government interest.”277 Requiring 
factual information about the product is allowed under a hybrid Zauderer rational 
basis test (viewing warnings as compelled disclosures of factual information, rather 
than restrictions on commercial speech) and four-prong Central Hudson test,278 
which allows broader applications for compelled commercial speech beyond 
remedying deception.279 Additionally, the FDA stated that the final rule would pass 
under either the Central Hudson or Zauderer tests.280 It relied on scientific evidence 
and consumer studies as rationale for its decisions, although it admitted that there 
may not be a direct link between the consumption of added sugars and the risk of 
obesity or heart disease.281 
In addition, the government maintains that it has a substantial interest in 
promoting the public health, a goal which it advocates will be furthered through the 
implementation of the rule.282 Justifying the particularities of the rule, the FDA 
conducted four consumer studies to evaluate consumer responses to added sugars 
information, and in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the 
FDA reopened the comment period after it completed the second set of two 
studies.283 The FDA maintained that its authority in this matter derived from the 
FDCA in accordance with the APA.284 When the food industry challenges the 
traffic-light label, the government could use similar arguments and defenses to 
defeat First Amendment claims. 
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Next, the current discussion on the proposed FDA rule imposing plain-
packaging graphic warnings on cigarette labels may reveal arguments and insights 
that food companies may raise as they fight a mandatory infringement of their FOP 
advertising space.285 Since both plain-packaging labels and traffic-light nutrition 
labels are designed to be mandatory and to occupy FOP space, the fate of one 
regulation may depend on the fate of the other regulation. 
It is helpful to understand a few key points in tobacco labeling history to 
predict the future of food labeling regulation. In 1996, tobacco was placed under the 
FDA’s jurisdiction,286 although tobacco did not actually come under the FDA’s 
authority until 2009.287 The United States passed its first piece of legislation on 
cigarette labeling in 1965288 followed by further tobacco regulations in 1969,289 
1983,290 1984,291 1986,292 and 1992.293  Starting with Mississippi and Minnesota, by 
1996, every state attorney general had filed suit against the big tobacco companies, 
seeking recovery for the costs to state Medicaid programs for treating tobacco-
related illnesses. While 4 states settled with tobacco companies on their own, the 
other 46 entered into a settlement: the $200 billion Master Settlement Agreement 
which also included restrictions on marketing and advertising, especially to youth.294 
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The Master Settlement Agreement also expanded access to many tobacco industry 
documents, which lead to advances in research.295 
By 2000, federal regulators had become aware of this public health concern 
and were ready to propose a different tobacco labeling approach: a plain-package 
approach. According to the FDA, while cigarette packages have carried health 
warnings for some time, the warnings did not adequately educate consumers on the 
health harms of cigarette smoking.296 Starting with the first cigarette warning 35 
years ago in 1966, cigarette packages and advertisements have displayed warnings 
such as, “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, 
Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.”297 According to 
research, “today’s warnings have become virtually invisible.” 298 
The Engle litigation also signaled a shift in public sentiment. In Engle I, 
the class action including only Florida citizens and residents won their suit, but in 
Engle II the reward was thrown out as excessive and the class decertified.299 
Importantly, in Engle III, “[w]hen the Florida Supreme Court rejected the $145 
billion award in 2006, it left intact some critical findings of the trial court—that 
smoking causes diseases, that nicotine is addictive, that cigarettes are defective and 
dangerous and that tobacco companies concealed the health effects of smoking.”300 
Although decertification made it more difficult to litigate these issues, the court in 
Engle III allowed jury-determined causation and liability to carry over into the 
individual cases.301 For tobacco companies, these high-value awards, coupled with 
hundreds of millions of dollars paid in attorneys’ fees to defend them, could 
negatively impact share prices and make shareholders feel the financial price of 
continued litigation.302 
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In 2009, Congress passed The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act, which granted the FDA authority to regulate the tobacco industry.303 It 
also would have required GWLs on cigarette packaging, but the GWL requirement 
was struck down in 2012 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration over First 
Amendment concerns.304 That decision has since been overruled in part through the 
Court’s decision in American Meat Institute v. United States Department of 
Agriculture, in which the Court, in an en banc decision, expanded Zauderer’s 
applications beyond cases concerning deception.305 In contrast, the Court in R.J. 
Reynolds applied the Hudson standard, and the FDA developed its new regulation 
with that stricter standard in mind.306  
The FDA published its final rule in the Federal Register in March 2020, 
with an effective date 15 months after in June 2021.307  In its proposed rule, the FDA 
states that it believes the new warnings would pass under either Zauderer or Hudson 
standards.308 The FDA is proposing GWLs that would cover at least 50% of the front 
and rear panels.309 The FDA proposes that no later than five months after the final 
rule, compliance plans with details on packaging and advertising would have to be 
submitted.310 There will also be a 30-day grace period, after which manufacturers 
would be unable to introduce any noncompliant packages.311 Eleven GWLs were 
selected as an implementation of a provision of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act.312 
To address criticism with the 2009 rule, the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services’ website includes information addressing the very 
claims upon which the 2009 rule was struck down, including peer-review studies.313  
Each GWL suggested in the new rule includes an image and accompanying text 
showcasing a particular health risk related to smoking with links to numerous 
scientific studies showing those health risks, as well as studies that track the lack of 
awareness within the U.S. population regarding those health risks. The newly 
proposed rule introduces GWLs with the intention of curbing cigarette use, but to 
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comply with the First Amendment, it seeks to inform the public about the dangers 
of lesser-known tobacco-related illnesses and diseases. While many Americans 
acknowledge the dangers that smoking cigarettes pose to lung health and overall 
health, the various other specific health risks associated with cigarettes are not as 
widely known and understood. In the 2006 United States. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
opinion, a court found big tobacco companies in violation of the RICO Act.314 A 
lengthy appeals process followed that culminated in requirements for tobacco 
companies to make public health statements about their products that accurately 
portray nicotine and to refrain from the use of certain terms, such as “low tar” to 
describe their cigarettes.315 
Despite these efforts to preclude litigation, the final rule was challenged 
shortly after in the Eastern District of Texas on April 3, 2020.316 Due to the 
limitations on court proceedings during the pandemic crisis, a joint motion to 
postpone the effective date of the rule by 120 days to October 16, 2021, was accepted 
by the court.317 The tobacco companies are urging the court to strike down both the 
rule and the part of the Family Smoking Prevention and Control Act on graphic 
warning requirements to prevent further litigation. Although the companies lost this 
argument in 2012 in the Sixth Circuit,318 the present case is in the Fifth Circuit.319 
The tobacco companies claim the FDA lacks the statutory authority to do this. The 
cigarette manufacturers’ main arguments include the obsoleteness of the warning. 
They say that if research shows everyone already knows smoking is dangerous, why 
do they need to include these warnings? These are the types of arguments that were 
anticipated and submitted throughout the notice and comment period. 
Philip Morris International’s CEO has stated publicly that the company, 
which makes Marlboro cigarettes, is phasing out traditional cigarettes in favor of e-
cigarettes and other debatably healthier alternatives.320 With different labeling 
requirements in so many different countries, it may be more economic to consolidate 
regulations and take a worldwide approach. Additionally, the corporation is starting 
to sell life insurance, providing discounts to smokers who quit temporarily or 
permanently or who switch from traditional cigarettes to a smokeless tobacco 
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product.321 The House passed legislation to ban the sale nationwide of certain 
flavored nicotine pods, although the Senate has not brought it to a vote yet.322 
The FDA’s labeling strategy is not unique. Around the world, 40 countries 
require warning labels of some kind.323 Some regulations already in effect, such as 
plain packaging, go much further than what the United States is proposing. To this 
end, while cigarette companies have fought other regulations in court with different 
labeling requirements in so many different countries, adopting plain packaging is 
one way for the FDA to consolidate regulations and take a global labeling approach.  
B. Arbitral Tribunals and the World Trade Organization 
When the United States enacts a federal rule, that rule applies to both 
domestic and foreign companies, thereby making the U.S. government accountable 
to challenges from domestic firms (constitutional and other claims in domestic 
courts noted above) and from foreign countries in either WTO proceedings or 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) proceedings. WTO and BIT complaints are 
directed at administrative measures enacted by member countries.324 The traffic-
light symbol would be an administrative measure required of all foreign and 
domestic food companies, according to the international law as found in BITs and 
the WTO. Foreign-based food companies, like Nestlé (Switzerland) and Danone 
(France),325 could challenge this measure in arbitral tribunals by invoking their 
country membership in a BIT; likewise, these companies could petition their 
respective home countries to challenge the measure in the WTO by invoking their 
country membership in the WTO. 
Considering possible challenges against a traffic-light label in these global 
venues, it is useful to examine arguments that countries raised in challenging other 
measures similar to the traffic-light-labeling measure. This section does not discuss 
global challenges regarding the last round of regulations on the NFP because of one 
key distinction between the recommended traffic-light indicator label and the NFP: 
the traffic-light indicator will appear on the FOP, possibly infringing upon the brand 
owner’s intellectual property. To examine the challenges that the unique FOP 
placement raises, it is useful to examine the legal claims against rules that have 
infringed upon FOP space, such as the Australian tobacco control measures. 
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Tobacco control measures, widely known as plain-packaging regulations 
or regulations aimed at regulating FOP, are also “measures” as falling under and 
defined by the WTO. While they now appear in 40 countries around the world, they 
were originally challenged in arbitration proceedings and in the WTO, starting in 
Australia in 2011.326 The litigation brought by several countries and different parties 
took place across several different venues, but ultimately Australia won.327 The 
plain-packaging measures were held consistent with international law, making it 
unlikely that a new, mandatory traffic-light label in the United States would be 
objectionable. However, there are a few subtle points in which the litigation 
regarding a traffic-light label would differ. 
C. Lessons Learned from Plain-Packaging Litigation  
Even while tobacco consumption has been characterized as a global health 
epidemic,328 tobacco companies continue to challenge plain-packaging regulations 
across the globe. With tobacco legislation in 2011, Australia became the first nation 
to completely restrict tobacco advertising on cigarette packaging,329 and plain 
packaging has now progressed across the globe.330 As noted earlier, plain-packaging 
measures require generic or standardized packaging for a consumer product; all 
branding (including colors, logos, imagery, and trademarks) is removed from the 
FOP, and manufacturers are permitted to print only the brand name on the pack in a 
standardized size, font, and color. 
Foreign-based companies that locate investments in the United States may 
invoke BIT protection for their investments, enabling them to bring claims against 
the United States through arbitration.331 For example, in the Australia plain-
packaging litigation, to be discussed below, Philip Morris Asia, based in Hong 
Kong, invoked a 1993 BIT agreement between Hong Kong and Australia to argue 
that the plain-packaging rules breached foreign investment provisions.332 
To provide some historical context, packaging—along with logos, mascots, 
and images—has been characterized as one of the last vehicles for tobacco 
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advertising to initiate tobacco consumption, particularly to young people.333 The 
Australian regulations, including the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, the Trade 
Marks (Plain Packaging) Act 2011, and supporting regulations, introduced broad 
requirements for the packaging of tobacco-related products.334 Plain-packaging rules 
are “justified on public health grounds, because the removal of all branding will 
reduce consumer deception from misleading packaging, will increase the 
noticeability of health warnings, and will ultimately lead to less smoking.”335 For 
instance, the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 articulates the primary policy 
concerns of plain-packaging legislation: the protection of public health and the 
implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(“FCTC”).336 
Professor Sergio Puig, a leading authority on global plain-packaging 
tobacco litigation, identifies ten different international institutions that “have seen 
at least one tobacco case: the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),  ISDS arbitration 
tribunals under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(“ICSID”) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), the Court of Justice of 
the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”), the Eritrea-Ethiopia and the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunals, the Court of Justice of the Andean Community . . . 
as well as the WTO, tribunals under its predecessor the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), and the Southern Common Market . . . dispute 
settlement bodies.”337 The claims brought in these international cases can be 
simplified and organized as issues over: (1) property rights; (2) authority to regulate; 
(3) discrimination; and (4) unnecessary obstacles to trade. 
Australia’s plain-packaging rules were challenged in several international 
venues.338 In the litigation, tobacco companies argued that the plain-packaging 
legislation limits advertising and effective use of trademarks in their traditional 
function to indicate source of origin and associated quality.339 Plain packaging 
impacted intellectual property of the owners of tobacco-related products through 
these limitations on trademarks that would normally be used on packaging.340 The 
plain-packaging restrictions only permit the use of word marks in prescribed size, 
font, and color in a designated position on the packet,341 and they restrict graphics 
or device marks.342 Tobacco companies argue that these restrictions on the use of 
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their trademarks have significant economic consequences.343 Tobacco-related 
trademark owners have claimed breach of their rights in domestic constitutional 
litigation,344 investor–state dispute litigation,345 and in the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of the WTO.346 Each will be discussed in turn. 
First, tobacco related trademark owners claimed breach of their rights in 
domestic constitutional legislation. In JT International SA v. Commonwealth and 
British American Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v.  Commonwealth, tobacco companies 
unsuccessfully argued to the High Court of Australia that the Australian plain-
packaging legislation constituted acquisition of their trademark rights by the 
government, and this was inconsistent with constitutional requirements that the 
acquisition of property be on just terms.347 The High Court found that the legislation 
did not acquire the applicants’ intellectual property rights so the claim could not be 
established.348 
In the next set of suits, tobacco-related trademark owners claimed 
devaluation of their intellectual property rights in investor–state dispute 
settlement.349 To date, the tobacco companies have been unsuccessful in all of the 
proceedings, showing how international investment law can accommodate public 
health objectives, but the proceedings in Australia (and later in Uruguay) took 
several years at considerable expense.350 The first case was an international 
investment arbitration action commenced by Philip Morris Asia against Australia. 
Philip Morris Asia argued that changes resulting from plain-packaging legislation 
deprived them of the value of their investment as it was enacted subsequent to their 
acquisition of intellectual property rights to tobacco,351 inconsistent with the 
Australia-Hong Kong Bilateral Investment Treaty.352 However, it was found that 
these rights had been deliberately acquired so as to exploit the investor–state dispute 
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mechanism.353 The action ended in interlocutory proceedings that determined 
bringing the claim under these circumstances constituted an abuse of right under 
international law.354 
During the plain-packaging legislation in the arbitral tribunals and in the 
WTO case, Australia used several international treaties to justify domestic 
legislation: the FCTC; the “Right to Health;” the UN International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“IECSCR”355); the corresponding “Right to 
Food;” the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”); and the “Right of 
the Child.” These arguments contributed to Australia’s success. 
Australia used the right-to-health argument in the investment and WTO 
proceedings because it was bound by the ICESCR.356 Australia acknowledged the 
relevance of the human right to the highest attainable standard of health in 
explanatory material surrounding plain-packaging legislation. Compliance with the 
FCTC is an objective of the legislation.357 The FCTC recognizes both the human 
right to health and public health imperatives,358 and these commitments are the most 
important human rights implicated by plain-packaging legislation.359 Article 11 of 
the FCTC requires parties to the treaty to adopt and implement effective packaging 
and labelling measures within three years of becoming a party, including measures 
requiring minimum sizing of graphic warnings about the negative health impacts of 
tobacco on tobacco packaging.360 The Guidelines to Article 11 were adopted by 
signatories to assist states to improve the effectiveness of measures related to the 
packaging and labelling of tobacco-related products.361 While there is debate about 
the extent to which the FCTC Guidelines that require states to implement plain 
 
 353. Australia/Hong Kong Investment Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments (Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Austl), PCA Case. No. 2012-12, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 585–88 (Dec. 17, 2015). 
 354. Id. 
 355. The United States signed but did not ratify the UN ICESCR. See International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1977, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 356. See Explanatory Statement, Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) 14 
(Austl.).  
 357. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.).   
 358. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, May 21, 2003, 2302 
U.N.T.S. 166; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 
11 OF THE WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL (2008) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 11].   
 359. See Shannon Gravely et al., The Impact of the 2009/2010 Enhancement of 
Cigarette Health Warning Labels in Uruguay: Longitudinal Findings from the International 
Tobacco Control Survey, 25 BRITISH MED. J. 89 (2014); see also David Hammond et al., 
Pictorial Health Warnings on Cigarette Packs in the United States: An Experimental 
Evaluation of the Proposed FDA Warnings, 15 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 93, 97 (2012). 
 360. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 11, supra note 358. 
 361. At its third session in November 2008, the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) 
adopted guidelines for implementation of Article 11 of the WHO FCTC on “Packaging and 
Labelling of Tobacco Products.” Id. 
2020] TAMING AMERICA'S SUGAR RUSH 731 
packaging constitute binding obligations in international law,362 ICESCR’s 
requirement for states to progressively realize the human right to health for 
individuals is clear.363 Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ 
(“CESCR”) General Comment 14 interpreting the right to health identifies tobacco-
related measures as relevant to the right to health.364 
Finally, plain packaging gained global attention in 2017 when the WTO 
upheld Australia’s right to impose plain-package label restrictions on the sale of 
tobacco products.365 Honduras, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, and Cuba brought 
WTO suits against Australia in 2012, along with over 40 third-parties or other parties 
with an interest in this dispute.366 The four key parties alleged that plain packaging 
is an unjustifiable encumbrance on the use of trademarks prohibited by Article 20 
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”), and an unnecessary obstacle to trade under Article 2.2 of the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) given that it is more restrictive than 
necessary because there is no evidence that such measures actually contribute to the 
protection of health.367 
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Similar to the claims made in the investment arbitration, the complaining 
parties in the WTO litigation argued that depriving trademarks of the possibility to 
fulfil their core function of distinguishing products vis-à-vis the end consumer for 
products is incompatible with key multilateral treaties such as the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement and regional and national trademark laws.368 They argued that the impact 
of plain packaging on trademark owners and consumers is significant because 
manufacturers can no longer use their valuable intellectual property to signify the 
origin and quality of their products, and consumers are more likely to be confused 
and unable to distinguish between competing products. The very core of the 
trademark property right is compensation when a trademark is confiscated. 
Similar to the investment arbitration, Australia justified the impugned 
provisions citing domestic public health objectives and compliance with the 
FCTC.369 In the WTO Disputes engaging TRIPS Article 20, Australia’s FCTC 
obligations were identified by the Panel as relevant to its justification for 
implementing plain-packaging legislation.370 The FCTC’s right-to-health 
obligations can be also be found in the CRC. Arguably, the FCTC interprets right-
to-health obligations found in ICESCR that are relevant to health obligations related 
to the consumption of tobacco.371 Compliance with certain obligations in each of 
these agreements justifies restrictions on trademark rights that can guide treaty 
interpretation as to the meaning of “unjustifiably” in each of the disputes. 
Additionally, a key relevant obligation engaged by plain-packaging legislation is 
Australia’s obligation to protect the right to health by taking “all necessary measures 
to safeguard persons within their jurisdiction from infringements of the right to 
health by third parties.”372 ICESCR includes the failure of states to regulate the 
activities of corporations that will violate the right to health of others and the failure 
to protect consumers and workers from activities that are detrimental to health, 
including marketing and consumption of tobacco.373 There is well-documented 
evidence of intentional failure to disclose negative health impacts of tobacco by 
tobacco companies, which engages additional obligations for states to protect 
individuals.374 Australia has attempted to address this protection obligation through 
the plain-packaging legislation. 
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In sum, according to the 2016 Post-Implementation Review, plain-
packaging rules have been successful in smoking cessation in Australia.375 
Importantly, Australia was able to justify regulations based on several treaties—
treaties that only a select number of countries have joined. In contrast to Australia, 
the United States does not have international treaties to rely upon to defend 
mandatory regulations. The United States has signed onto each of these conventions 
(the FCTC, the IECSCR, and CRC) without ratifying a single one.376 The United 
States is not obligated to enact any general or specific legislation to protect the 
“Right of the Child,” the “Right to Health,” or the “Right to Food.” This means that 
the U.S. government is not bound by international human rights treaties to 
implement a mandatory nutrition label, nor can it use these treaties to justify the 
mandatory traffic-label approach. 
This is not to say that federal regulators will disregard WHO conventions 
calling for public health regulation on added sugar. With diet-related chronic 
diseases accounting for 60% of deaths worldwide and costing millions in rising 
medical costs,377 the United States agrees with the WHO recommendations that 
countries reduce exposure to and marketing of foods that are high in sugar, 
particularly to children who are vulnerable to advertising. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presents a need for more sugar regulation based on public 
health, arguing for a federal approach to regulating nutritional information found on 
the front of a food package. In the United States, about 13% of calories consumed 
by adults come from added sugars, and such sugars make up an even higher percent 
of children’s calories (16%).378 Added sugars are not only pervasive in the food 
industry, they are a public health risk. New studies also show strong and convincing 
evidence that individuals with chronic health diseases, e.g., heart disease, obesity, 
and type 2 diabetes, are at higher risk of complications from COVID-19 compared 
to those who are deemed healthy.379 The problem is that the food industry’s labeling 
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approaches mislead consumers to purchase unhealthy foods with more added sugars 
than they imagine. This Article argues for a mandatory traffic-light label, such as 
the traffic-light indicator used in the United Kingdom, to communicate this public 
health risk in a quick and easy format. 
This Article provides several arguments that the FDA can use to support a 
traffic-light label and to defend it in face of industry challenge in domestic courts 
and international venues. To preview industry arguments that will undoubtedly 
arise, the Article examines arguments that have been used to challenge other public 
health labeling measures in other countries and contexts. Plain-packaging labeling 
measures were adopted in Australia in 2009 and were successful in curbing tobacco 
use; importantly, Australia defeated challenges to these measures in domestic courts, 
arbitral tribunals, and the WTO. Because both plain-packaging labels (regulating 
tobacco) and traffic-light nutrition labels (regulating added sugar) are designed to 
be mandatory and to take up FOP space, the fate of traffic-light labeling can be 
analyzed in the context of tobacco labeling. While a mandatory label is preferred, 
other recommendations and solutions are presented short of this approach. The FDA 
may wish to pursue a voluntary label as seen in Australia and the United Kingdom. 
This Article and the traffic-light label approach are timely, relevant, and 
provide insight to addressing a global problem. Added sugar is already a global 
public health concern, and methods to regulate and label added sugars will only 
become more pressing as trade and food industry consolidation continues to 
encourage (rather than curb) the proliferation of unhealthy foods. As global trade 
and consumption of unhealthy food continues, there is an urgent public health need 
for international standards in this area, particularly given that some developing 
countries do not have the resources to develop standards of their own. Adopting a 
traffic-light-indicator symbol would not only correct a market failure in the United 
States, but it would also convince other countries to adopt FOP regulations to 
communicate public health risks more effectively and convince the food industry to 




table.html (last updated July 28, 2020). 
